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Lost Options for Mutual Gain?
The Lawyer, the Layperson, and Dispute
Resolution in Early America
Carli N. Conklin*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1786, legal reform activist Benjamin Austin undertook a campaign to
promote the use of arbitration over litigation as the primary method of
dispute resolution in Massachusetts. Austin argued passionately and
practically for the benefits of arbitration over litigation. He did not, however,
argue persuasively. Although supported by a groundswell of anti-lawyer
sentiment, Austin ultimately failed in securing the triumph of arbitration.
Austin's fatal flaw was not in the power of his arguments, which
appealed to a variety of motives for using arbitration, or in the method of
arbitration he promoted. His fatal flaw was in framing his arguments of
motive and method too strongly within the growing undercurrent of antilawyer sentiment that existed at the time. As a result, he conflated lawyers,
whom he described as the legal elite, with the problems that besieged the
legal system. He focused so intently on promoting arbitration as a
replacement for litigation that he neglected the ways in which arbitration and
litigation could work in tandem toward legal reform. The result was a
polarized public policy debate with legal reformers like Austin--on the one
side-promoting arbitration, and the rising legal profession--on the otherpromoting litigation in the courts.
While failing in his efforts to replace litigation with arbitration, Austin
nevertheless succeeded in encouraging arbitration as a method of dispute
resolution. In the years following his writings, Austin saw common law
arbitration in Massachusetts joined by a statutory model, with both types of
arbitration promoted and practiced alongside, and as an alternative to,
litigation in the courts throughout the antebellum period.
Although Austin advocated strongly for arbitration to replace litigation,
his ultimate goal was to reform the legal system so as to secure cheap and
speedy access to justice for the layperson. Replacing litigation with
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arbitration was simply his means to that end. While Austin failed in his
means, he succeeded in his end. As he stated in the preface to the 1814 reissue of his pamphlet campaign, cheap and speedy access to justice had been
secured through legal reforms that drew from the strengths of both arbitration
and the courts, and the development of a dispute resolution system where
lawyers and laypersons could utilize litigation or arbitration to secure justice.
Exploring Austin's pamphlet campaign in its historical context not only
provides us with a snapshot of the arguments for and against dispute
resolution in early America, but also serves as a corrective to the prevailing
accounts of arbitration in American legal history. As the broader context of
Austin's pamphlet campaign will demonstrate, arbitration both began earlier
and lasted longer than traditionally recognized. What we would today call
arbitration existed in early America in a variety of forms, including common
law arbitration, statutory arbitration, and reference by rule of the court. And
the reasons why today's disputants choose arbitration over litigation have a
broader history, as well; the motives most appealed to by Austin in his
pamphlet campaign bear a striking similarity to the reasons individuals give
for choosing litigation alternatives to resolve their disputes today.
This article explores the context and content of Austin's pamphlet
campaign and its implications for understanding the role of arbitration in
early American law in five parts:
Part II sets the stage by providing a brief overview of the prevailing
history of dispute resolution and the development of the legal profession in
colonial and early America.
Part III discusses the ways in which battles over arbitration and litigation
were a part of larger calls for legal reform in Massachusetts in the late 1700s
and early 1800s.

and the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) Alternative Dispute Resolution
Section's 2012 Works-in-Progress Conference at The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law. A special thanks to Charles W. McCurdy and Mary Kay Kisthardt for
their comments on earlier drafts and to my former research assistant, Jimmy Cruse. Any
errors remain mine alone.
1 Austin's recurring thesis is that "the 'order' of Lawyers is dangerous in our
republic, if they are permitted to pursue their current practice." Benjamin Austin,
Observations on the PerniciousPractice of the Law As Published Occasionally in the
Independent Chronicle 17 (Adams & Nourse 1786), microformed on Early Am. Imprints,
Ser. I, no. 19481 (AM. HIST. IMPRINTS) [hereinafter Austin 1786]. In the 1819 reprint of

his pamphlet, Austin explained that "their current practice" was one of delay and
expense: "the 'order' of Lawyers is dangerous in our republic, if they are permitted to
pursue their mal-practice by causing delays, and augmenting unreasonable charges."
Austin 1819, infra note 214, at 17.
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LOST OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL GAIN

Part IV demonstrates how, by too closely aligning his proposals for
arbitration with the anti-lawyer sentiment of the day, Austin polarized the
public policy debate and neglected to address the ways in which arbitration
and litigation could work together for legal reform.
Part V highlights that while Austin failed in his promotion of arbitration
over litigation, he nevertheless saw the realization of his larger goal, which
was to secure cheap and speedy access to justice for the layperson. His goal
ultimately was met through legal reforms that combined the strengths of both
arbitration and litigation.
Part VI explores Austin's pamphlet campaign in the broader context of
dispute resolution in American legal history, with a focus on its implications
for how we think about the history of dispute resolution today.

II. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN COLONIAL
AND EARLY AMERICA
Can any institution be more alarming in a republick, than an 'order' of men
who have it in their power to pervert the laws, by pernicious combinations
in every judiciary process? 2
The 'order' of lawyers.. .so far from being a 'necessary,' are in most
cases a useless body. As the laws can be better executed without them; and
as they are of late so rapidly increasing in all parts of the Commonwealth,
... it is become absolutely necessary, as we regard the welfare of the
community, that the people direct their Representatives to lay before the
Legislature, the present pernicious practice of this 'order,' that some
measure may be adopted effectually to stop them in their dangerous
progress. 3
In the years following the American Revolution, this type of anti-lawyer
sentiment helped fuel a movement to establish arbitration 4 as a replacement
2 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 47.
3 Id. at 10-11 (emphasis omitted).
4 In early America, "arbitration" typically designated settlement of a dispute prior to
the commencement of litigation, while "reference" provided for the submission of a
dispute to arbitration once litigation had commenced. Early Americans frequently used
the terms "arbitration" and "reference" synonymously. Common law arbitration suffered
from problems with enforcement. Austin promoted binding arbitration (arbitration with
award enforcement) and reference at the level of the Justices of the Peace to complement
the existing forms of common law arbitration and reference by rule of the Court of
Common Pleas. I have used the term "arbitration" throughout this work, making
distinctions between its various forms when necessary.
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to the legal system that was fast developing at the time. The early colonists
often employed common law arbitration to settle their disputes and, even
when disputes were submitted to the largely informal lay judges, the
colonists discouraged the use of professional lawyers either by prohibiting
them from practicing in the colonies altogether or by permitting the litigant
to be represented by a friend or relative instead of a skilled lawyer. 5
According to the prevailing histories, while this system of justice worked in
the smaller, economically self-contained communities of the early
seventeenth century, it began to fall apart by the end of the century as
increasingly complex community and commercial transactions required a
more predictable system of justice. 6 The communities themselves also
became more diverse, and, as a result of their increasingly dissimilar
populations, the courts became the institutions whose decisions were most
widely accepted. 7
As a result of these societal changes, the early seventeenth-century
emphasis on resolving disputes through community norms and absolute
moral standards began to be replaced by more technical forms of dispute
resolution that required trained lawyers. 8 This movement from mediation and
arbitration to litigation ebbed and flowed throughout the first half of the
eighteenth century. The legal establishment grew stronger in the early 1700s,
then met with resistance as the influence of the revivalist ministers of Great
Awakening in the 1740s renewed previous criticisms of legal forms of
dispute resolution. 9 Ironically, the Great Awakening simultaneously brought
about dissent among religious groups that, in turn, "weakened the power of
the churches as dispute-settlement institutions and reinforced the role of
secular courts." 10
In spite of the revivalist criticisms, it was the eighteenth century, with its
expansions in populations and commerce and the resulting emergence of a
more complex society, in which the legal profession really began to take hold

5 MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-

1876 34 (1976).
6

Id

7 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 35 (1983).

8 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 5, at 34.
9 AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 41 (citing RICHARD L. BUSHMAN, FROM PURITAN TO
YANKEE: CHARACTER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN CONNECTICUT, 1690-1765 231-35
(1980); Nelson, supra note 9, at 120-23); EMIL OBERHOLZER, DELINQUENT SAINTS:
DISCIPLINARY ACTION IN THE EARLY CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES OF MASSACHUSETTS

239 (1956)).
10
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in the colonies." Once it took hold, it grew quickly and the number of skilled
lawyers and judges increased dramatically by the time of the American
Revolution.12
III. ARBITRATION, LITIGATION, AND CALLS FOR LEGAL REFORM IN
ANTEBELLUM MASSACHUSETTS

The larger trends in societal change that were characteristic of colonial
and early America, as a whole, also played out in Massachusetts, but with
different results than those traditionally identified. Massachusetts increased,
not decreased, its dispute resolution options, adding a statutory mechanism to
encourage submission to arbitration, a statutory form of arbitration, and a
broader form of reference by rule of the court to its existing dispute
resolution mechanisms.13 Strong arguments in favor of these new forms of
dispute resolution surfaced in the Massachusetts debt crisis of the 1780s.
In the fall of 1786, Daniel Shays, a farmer and former captain of the
army, led a revolt of debt-ridden farmers to Springfield, Massachusetts where
his followers forced the adjournment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court and caused the Massachusetts legislature to, among other things, lower
court fees.14 On the outset of the rebellion, the electors of Braintree,
Massachusetts pushed back against the rising legal profession by demanding

11 RICHARD ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG

REPUBLIC 111 (1971).
12 Id

13 These changes in Massachusetts are reflective of similar trends in antebellum
Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York, suggesting that what has been seen as an early
American decline in the legal profession's support for, and disputants' use of, arbitration
may actually be an increase in the variety of dispute resolution options-common law
arbitration, common law arbitration with award enforcement, statutory arbitration, and
reference by rule of the court-available to individuals in conflict. See generally Carli N.
Conklin, Transformed,Not Transcended: ExtrajudicialDispute Resolution in Antebellum
Kentucky and New Jersey, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 39 (2006) (regarding the legal

profession's support of these various forms of dispute resolution in Kentucky and New
Jersey throughout the antebellum period); Eben Moglen, Note, Commercial Arbitration
in the Eighteenth Century: Searchingfor the TransformationofAmerican Law, 93 YALE

L.J. 135, 149 (1983) (arguing that a decrease in the use of reference in colonial and
antebellum New York may actually be the result of an increase in the use of common law
arbitration, as a result of better mechanisms for enforcing the awards); and William
Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey,

1956 WASH. U. L.REv. 193 (arguing for the prevalence of arbitration among New York's
merchants from the colonial era through the twentieth century).
14 PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 187-188 (1998).
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that the Massachusetts General Court (Massachusetts' bicameral legislature)
discontinue financial grants to Harvard, limit the number of attorneys, and
pay attorney fees out of the public treasury.' 5
Shays' Rebellion is a dramatic example of the anti-lawyer hostility that
arose in Massachusetts in the latter part of the eighteenth century. 16 This rise
in anti-lawyer hostility was largely in response to the economic depression in
Massachusetts in the early 1780s, which drove many debtors to court,
stimulating both an increase in hostility toward lawyers and an increase in
the number of lawyers in the state.' 7 In 1740, there was 1 lawyer for every
10,349 people in Massachusetts.1 8 This ratio increased to 1:9,349 by 1770,
1:2,872 by 1800, and 1:1,153 by 1840.19 Reflecting this upsurge in the
number of lawyers in Massachusetts, a poem entitled "On the Multitude of
Lawyers" appeared in the December, 1789 edition of the Massachusetts
Magazine:
I wonder William, Harry said,
From whom have all those Lawyers bread?
Quoth Will, I wonder at the same:
But Harry we are both to blame;
The more the Dogs the More the Game. 20
From 1760 to 1840, this type of anti-lawyer hostility grew as lawyers
increasingly came to be perceived as an elite class, with more and more new
lawyers in Massachusetts coming from the sons of existing lawyers and
judges21 and increasing numbers of college graduates becoming lawyers.
From 1761 to 1780, 12.5% of Harvard graduates became lawyers, while
23.8% and 24.1% of Harvard graduates became lawyers from 1781-1800 and

15 ALAN HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE GREAT
AWAKENING TO THE REVOLUTION 179 (1966).
16 For a discussion of the connections between Shays' Rebellion and animosity
towards lawyers, see Ruth G. Matz, Lawyers and Shays' Rebellion, 21 BOsTON B. J. 5
(1977).
17 GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION INMASSACHUSETTS 1760-1840 44-45 (1979).
18 Id at 200 (see Table 23).
19 Id
20 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 5, at 54 (quoting ON THE MULTITUDE OF LAWYERS,
MASS. MAG. 1 (Dec. 1789)).
21 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 171.
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1800-1820 respectively. 22 Not only were more college graduates becoming
lawyers, but also more lawyers were becoming professionally trained.
Massachusetts had a bar association for attorneys early on, and its
membership became increasingly professionalized over time. In 1785, the
legislature passed "An Act Regulating the Admission of Attorneys". 23 The
Act included both personal and professional qualifications, stating that, to be
admitted as an attorney in Massachusetts, one had to be "of good moral
character, and well affected to the Constitution and Government of this
Commonwealth, and hath had opportunity to qualify himself for the office,
and hath made such proficiency as will render himself useful therein...." 24
Prior to admission, aspiring attorneys also had to take an oath in court. The
content of this oath attests to some of the difficulties surrounding the rising
legal profession. Aspiring attorneys were required to swear that they would
"do no falsehood" and that they would not "wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any false, groundless, or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the
same" and to "delay no man for lucre or malice." 25
The same 1785 General Court Act that regulated admission as an
attorney also provided for layperson selection of counsel. 2 6 By "such
counsel", the legislature intended to allow parties to select layperson
representation, but the lawyers disagreed, successfully asserting that
""counsel' could be interpreted only to mean a professional lawyer." 2 7
Under the Bar's standards, college graduates were required to complete a
three year apprenticeship while non-college graduates were required to
complete a five year apprenticeship. 2 8 This system of a long, formal
22

Id. at 144 (See Table 17). Among other colleges graduating significant numbers
Massachusetts lawyers, Yale, Brown, and Dartmouth also saw increased percentages
graduating lawyers from 1770-1835. However, Williams and Bowdoin saw decreases
their percentages of graduating lawyers from 1795-1835. See GAWALT, supra note 17,
141, 142-143 (Tables 14-16).

of
of
in
at

23 See An Act Regulating the Admission of Attorneys, 1785 MAss. ACTS 475-76,

available at The State Library of Massachusetts Electronic Repository,
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1785/1785acts0023.pdf (last visited April 12,
2013, 7:09 PM) (hereinafter An Act Regulating Admission).
24
Id

25 _[d
26 Id.
27 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 60 (citing to a similar permission of layperson counsel

by the Superior Court in 1778 and to legislative and newspaper records following passage
of the 1785 Statute).
28 Id. For an example of bar association rules, see Rules of the Bar of the County of
Essex, Massachusetts (1831), in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 85-89 (Charles M.

Haar ed., 1965).
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education and recommendation by the Bar association for admittance
appealed to lawyers because it restricted the number of additional lawyers
entering the profession and helped guarantee higher incomes and
professional status based on seniority. 29 This professional class of lawyers in
Massachusetts continued to grow in the 1800s and provided fuel for
continued anti-lawyer sentiment in the 1830s. 30 By the mid-1800s, lawyers
were key figures in the legislative and executive branches and were dominant
in the judicial branch. 3 1
The judicial branch of Massachusetts included a Court of General Sessions
for each county, which was comprised of that county's justices of the peace
and which met quarterly. 32 The Justices of the Peace, who were appointed by
each county, operated as one-man courts; they formed the basis of the
Massachusetts judiciary. 33 Most men appointed to the judiciary in
Massachusetts in the 1700s were not trained lawyers, but were upstanding
men in the community. 34 As a result, in pre-revolutionary Massachusetts,
legal decision-making was retained by laypersons in the local communities. 35
However, the structure and make-up of the Massachusetts judiciary
began to change after the American Revolution. In 1782, the judicial system
was revised, so that it consisted of the Supreme Judicial Court, the County
Courts of Common Pleas, and the Judges of General Sessions of the Peace
(consisting of the Justices of the Peace, sitting jointly36 ), as well as specialty

29 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 136-137.
30
Id. at 170-171. For an exploration of the tensions lawyers faced in this time
period, see Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Dilemma ofthe American Lawyer in the Post-

RevolutionaryEra, 35 NOTRE DAME L. 48 (1959-1960) and Anton-Hermann Chroust,
The American Legal Profession: Its Agony andEcstasy (1776-1840), 46 NOTRE DAME L.

487 (1970-1971).
31 Id. at 189.
32

WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF

LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 15 (1975).
33 Id.

34 Id. at 33. For example, from 1769-1774, nine of the eleven justices of the

Superior Court of Massachusetts had never practiced law and only three of these nine had
studied for the Bar. This trend was also reflected in the lower courts of Massachusetts.
See NELSON, supra note 32, at 33.
35 Id. at 36.

36 For a description of the relationship between the Justices of the Peace and the
Courts of General Sessions, see FOUNDING FAMILIES: DIGITAL EDITIONS OF THE PAPERS
OF THE WINTHROPS AND THE ADAMSES, JAMES TAYLOR, ED., (2007),

http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=LJAOld091
12, 2013, 5:58 PM).
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courts for admiralty (until 1789) and probate. 37 Reform was necessary to
eliminate the lack of finality in the lower Courts of Common Pleas'
decisions, a problem that led to increased expenses for parties and profitable
delays for lawyers since most Courts of Common Pleas' cases were then sent
on appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court. 38
The path to such reform was not clear and the conflict over legal reform
in Massachusetts found its expression in the political sphere. In the two
decades following Austin's 1786 newspaper campaign, that conflict was
battled out between the Anti-Federalist Party (which, in 1790, became the
Republican Party) on the one hand, and the Federalist Party on the other.39
The Republican Party had Radical and Moderate wings, both of which
played a pivotal role in the debates surrounding the conflict.
The Federalists proposed relatively modest reform of the judiciary,
including a guaranteed income for the Supreme Court justices, a limit to
appeals and reviews to prevent unnecessary delays, special law terms to be
held annually to decide difficult questions and points of law that had arisen
throughout the year, expansion of the Court of Common Pleas' jurisdiction
with their decisions to be final in cases of low value, juries that would under
no circumstances interpret the law, and published decisions of the Supreme
Judicial Court,4 0 to encourage consistency in decisions.
In contrast, the Radical Republicans promoted much broader reform.
Their reforms reflected their belief that trained lawyers were immoral men,
influenced by money:
Who would make out, clear as light
That white was black, and black was white
And with like arguments well strung
That wrong was right, and right was wrong. 4 1

37 Prior to 1782, the Massachusetts judicial system consisted of the Superior Court
of Judicature, the Inferior Court of Common Pleas, the Judges of General Sessions of the
Peace, and specialty courts for Probate and Admiralty. GAWALT, supra note 17, at 211.

The courts underwent additional changes after 1782. The Judges of General Sessions
became the General Courts of Sessions in 1807, were largely subsumed within the
Common Pleas' courts from 1809-1819, and were finally abolished in 1828. The County
Courts of Probate continued, but the "District Courts of Admiralty [were] superseded by
the federal court system in 1789." GAWALT, supra note 17, at 211.
38
Id. at 184-85.
39
Id. at 184.
40
ELLIS, supra note 11, at 188-90.
41 Id. at 200.

589

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol.28:3 2013]

Anti-lawyer proposals for radical reform of the justice system came from
agrarian reformers who criticized the expenses of the Courts of Common
Pleas and the Court of General Sessions. The reformers suggested, among
other things, abolishing the Court of General Sessions and enlarging the
jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace. 42 The effect of such reforms would
be to return judicial decision-making to the local level and to the Justices of
the Peace, who often were laypersons. Radical judicial reform in
Massachusetts promoted an elected judiciary, 43 which was another attempt at
local control, and encompassed calls for extrajudicial dispute resolution by
promoting the use of common law arbitration, 44 the creation of a system of
statutory arbitration (called reference) as a substitute to the lower courts, 4 5
and a limit to the use of lawyers in dispute resolution. 46
Benjamin Austin shared the Radical Republicans' desire to replace the
existing litigation system with arbitration. The son of a prominent Boston
merchant, 4 7 Austin was a visible and vocal figure of the Massachusetts
Radical Republicans. 4 8 In 1786, Austin wrote a series of articles that were
then published together in a pamphlet entitled "Observations on the
Pernicious Practice of Law" under the pen name "Honestus." 4 9 Through his
talented and persuasive writing, Austin became the state's greatest expositor
of Radical judicial reform in the late 1700s 5 0 and one of the greatest
proponents of arbitration in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts. 5' Austin went

42 NELSON, supra note 32, at 70.
43 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 199.
44

Id. at 198-99.
.45 Id. at 201. Although reference as defined here is the submission of a dispute to
arbitration after litigation has commenced, the terms often were used synonymously in
early America, as seen in the Massachusetts statutes on arbitration and reference in the
antebellum period and HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A LAW DICTIONARY CONTAINING
DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS AND PHRASES OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE,

ANCIENT AND MODERN 238 (1891, 1910).
46 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 200.
47 Id.

48 Id. at 208-09.
49 For a detailed discussion of the newspaper letters that were compiled into
Austin's pamphlet campaign, see Frederic Grant, Jr., Benjamin Austin, Jr.'s Struggle with
the Lawyers, 25 BosTON BAR J. 19 (1981) and Frederic Grant, Jr., Observations on the
PerniciousPracticeof the Law, 68 A.B.A. J. 580 (1982).
50 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 208-09.
51 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 52.
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on to serve as a Massachusetts state senator in the 1790s5 2 and his original
1786 letters were reproduced for public distribution in 1814.
Austin's promotion of arbitration over litigation was part of the Radical
Republicans' response to a change in the make-up of the judiciary that had
been occurring in Massachusetts. 53 In the 50 years following the American
Revolution, 24 of 26 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court5 4 justices were
lawyers.55 As trained lawyers, the judges had begun to assume more power
to assert the law. For example, in 1808, the Supreme Judicial Court in Coffin
v. Coffin5 6 held that judges were required to instruct their juries on every
material point at issue. 5 7 By 1830, the judges stated the laws to the juries,
who were then required to abide by the court's instructions in order for their
verdicts to stand.58 This practice ofjudicial instruction was accepted by some
as a reflection of the need for predictable rulings in the increasingly
commercialized economy of nineteenth-century Massachusetts. 59 Those who
accepted this judicial role believed that the juries were no longer capable of
providing such predictability in light of the post-Revolution dissipation of
shared ethical norms. 60 Federalist reformers believed that the jury was no

52 ELLIS, supranote 11, at 208-09.

53 In his pamphlet campaign, Austin argued for five reforms: "proposals for the use
of arbitrators, for a system of concise codes of American law, for the right of a person to
present his own case in person or in writing, for the right of every man either to appear
personally or be represented by a friend who is not necessarily a member of the bar, and
finally, for the appointment of an advocate-general to represent those accused of crime."
Erwin C. Surrency, The PerniciousPracticeofLaw-A Comment 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.

241, 242 (1969). For a detailed list of the reforms, see Austin, supra note 1, at 25. The
first four of these proposed reforms dealt with Austin's larger call for layperson
administration of justice; Austin's argument for arbitration to replace the system of
litigation largely resulted from, and sought to address, the problems presented by the
second, third, and fourth areas of reform.
54 The Supreme Judicial Court was formerly called the Superior Court. See NELSON,
supra note 32, at 70.
55

Id. (citing WILLIAM SULLIVAN, AN ADDRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR OF
SUFFOLK, MASSACHUSETTS, AT THEIR STATED MEETING ON THE FIRST TUESDAY OF
MARCH, 1824 41-42 (1825); MASS. B. ASS'N, THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF

MASSACHUSETTS, 1692-1942 51).
56 4 Mass. 1 (1808) (cited in NELSON, supra note 32, at 168).
57 NELSON, supra note 32, at 168.
58
Id. at 8.
59
Id. at 165.
60
Id. at 166.
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longer able to bring shared community norms into the courtroom and
consistently apply them as law. 6 1
Republicans strongly opposed any attempts to usurp the law-making role
of the juries.62 While they supported the judge's role in instructing the jury
on matters of law, especially when they felt that the law had been
unnecessarily complicated by the parties' attorneys, they spoke strongly
against the idea that the judge, alone, should decide matters of law. 63 Such
attempts to place the law-making function solely in the hands of the judiciary
further instigated anti-lawyer hostility and, from 1790 to 1840, calls for
judicial reform included removing lawyers from the judiciary. 64
In the last two decades of the eighteenth century, the Massachusetts state
legislature passed several acts to instigate legal reform. Indeed, in the time
immediately following the American Revolution, it was the legislature that
most greatly conflicted with the lawyers for control of the law. 65 Individuals
voicing anti-lawyer sentiment petitioned their legislators to get rid of the
legal elite6 6 and some of the protestors' more minor reforms were enacted in
the 1780s, including two 1786 acts seeking to limit litigation in the courts of
law, primarily by setting out statutes of limitation for various causes of
action. 67 Of greatest significance for Austin's campaign was the legislature's
passage of a 1786 Act for Rendering Processes of Law Less Expensive,
which required Justices of the Peace to encourage disputants before them to
submit to arbitration, and the 1786 Referee Act, which set forth a statutory
form of arbitration for the resolution of disputes. 6 8
61 Id. at 170-71.
62 ELLIS, supranote 11, at 197.
63 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 5, 10, 14.
64 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 99.
65 Id. at 47.
66
Id. at 48.
67 An Act for the Limitation of PersonalActions, and for Avoiding Suits at Law,

1786 MASS. ACTS 168-71, available at The State Library of Massachusetts Electronic
Repository,
http://archives.1ib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1786/1786acts0052.pdf
[hereinafter Limitation of PersonalActions]; An Act for the Limitation of Real Actions,

1786 MASS. ACTS 29-30, available at The State Library of Massachusetts Electronic
Repository,
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1786/1786actsOO 13.pdf
[hereinafter Limitation ofReal Actions].
68 An Act for Rendering Processesin Law Less Expensive, 1786 MASS. ACTS 105-11

available at The State Library of Massachusetts Electronic Repository,
http://archives.1ib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1786/1786acts0043.pdf [hereinafter An Act
for Law Less Expensive]; An Act for Rendering the Decision of Civil Causes, as Speedy,
and as Little Expensive as Possible, 1786 MASS. ACTS 55-57, available at The State
Library
of
Massachusetts
Electronic
Repository,
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Although Massachusetts had long upheld common law arbitration, where
parties voluntarily chose to submit their disputes to arbitrators of their own
choosing instead of pursuing litigation, the 1786 Act for Rendering Processes
of Law Less Expensive strongly encouraged arbitration as an option for
disputants who had brought their claims before a Justice of the Peace. 69 The
1786 Referee Act also encouraged arbitration by providing a formal avenue
by which voluntary arbitration awards could be entered as a judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas and made final. 70 Parties in dispute were instructed
to follow a statutory form of submitting their claims to arbitration and the
court would then enforce the arbitration award. 7 ' Those who supported the
1786 Referee Act were hopeful that it would limit lawyers to criminal cases
and cases involving realty (two bodies of law that were traditionally excluded
from arbitration). 72 Although there was a decline in court action following

http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1786/1786acts0021.pdf

[hereinafter

1786

Referee Act].
69 An Act for Law Less Expensive, supra note 68.
70 1786 Referee Act, supra note 68.
71 Id. at 55-57. In his work, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860

151, (1977), Morton Horwitz argues that judges and lawyers undermined the purpose of
the Referee Act by increasing reversals on technicalities and declaring that, "When
parties leave the common law for these peculiar remedies, they cannot expect the Court
to show them particular favor." HORWITZ, supra note 71, at 151 (citing Durrellv. Merrill,

I Mass. 411, 413 (1805) (argument of counsel); Whitney v. Cook, 5 Mass. 139, 143
(1809) (Parsons, C.J.); Id. at 151 (citing Mansfield v. Doughty, 3 Mass. 398 (1807); Id. at
151 (citing Monosiet v. Post, 4 Mass. 532 (1808). See also Short v. Pratt, 6 Mass. 496
(1810)). Horwitz makes this same claim for arbitration in early America, as a whole. In
contrast, my research in New Jersey and Kentucky demonstrates that, far from reversing
on technicalities, the courts simply upheld common law arbitration under the common
law and upheld statutory arbitration according to the terms of the statute. See generally,
CONKLIN, supra note 13. Wesley A. Sturges suggests a similar trend in his work,
Common-Law and Statutory Arbitration:Problems Arisingfrom Their Coexistence, 46

MINN. L. REv. 819 (1962) at 819-820. In fact, the language quoted here by Horwitz
suggests not that the judges used the Referee Act as a means by which to legislate
arbitration out of existence, but that the judges had rightly identified the different
requirements of arbitration under the common law and arbitration under the statutory law,
and had applied those requirements accordingly.
72 The Referee Act covered civil cases only, excluding realty. Although Morton
Horwitz points to the realty exclusion as an act of judicial limitation of arbitration, this
exclusion was in keeping with the English common law, where criminal and realty cases
traditionally had been excluded from arbitration. (See HORWITZ, supra note 71, at 161; 3
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, infra note 247, at 15-17; and "arbitration" in
ARCHIBALD BROWN, A New Law Dictionary31 (1874)). Common law arbitrations were

often oral, both in agreement and award. Realty cases may have been excluded from
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these Acts, in 1789 the legislature subsequently passed a statute which
allowed litigants once again to go directly to the Court of Common Pleas
without first going through the Justice of the Peace, where they were
encouraged to use arbitration. Within a year, most disputants were once again
appearing in court with their lawyers. 73 However, under the 1786 Referee
Act, reference remained a post-filing path to arbitration even for these
disputants. 74
Even as the legislature encouraged the use of lay arbitrators, it
simultaneously strengthened the requirements for aspiring lawyers. In the
years following the Referee Act, the legislature introduced a statutory form
of professional training standards for lawyers and the Judiciary Committee,
which was controlled by lawyers, approved the new admissions standards as
part of the Revised Statutes. 75 The legislative standards mirrored the previous
Bar standards by requiring three years of study in an apprenticeship or law
school for admittance to the Bar but departed from the previous standards by
removing the need for Bar recommendation in order to enter into or advance
within the profession. 76 Although the standards removed the role of the Bar
as guardian of the profession, the Bar did not oppose them as being antilawyer. 77 These movements satisfied those promoting more modest reform
but did not satisfy those who wished to see more radical reform of the legal
profession.7 8
While radical reformers did achieve some victories in the legislature,
those victories were short-lived. As discussed previously, while the 1785 Act
Regulating the Admission of Attorneys provided for layman representation, 79
the word "counsel" in the statute was interpreted so restrictively as to include
only professional lawyers.80 The Act was intended to open up the practice of
law to laymen but the courts, controlled by the legal elite, restricted it to
those individuals having formal legal training.8' Thus, in spite of the
common law arbitrations due to prohibitions against parol agreements in land title
transactions.
73 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 5, at 55-56 (citing Charles R. McKirdy, Lawyers in
Crisis: The Massachusetts Legal Profession, 1760-1790 (1969) (unpublished PhD.
Dissertation, Northwestern University)).

74 1786 Referee Act, supra note 68.
75 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 183-85.
76

Id. at 184-85

77

Id.

78

Id. at 186.
Id. at 60.

79

80 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 60
81 Id. at 60-61.
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legislature's attempt to enact substantial reform, lawyers challenged the right
of laypersons to practice the law and evaded legislative prohibitions against
the legal profession's growing exclusivity. 82 The layperson's selection of
counsel was further limited when, in March of 1810, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts required a recommendation of the Bar before a
lawyer could practice before the Court of Common Pleas and all higher
courts. 83 This meant that lawyers, for the first time, were formally in control
of entrance to and advancement within the profession. 84
At the same time that the practice of law was becoming increasingly
professionalized, lawyers began replacing laypersons in legislative branch of
government. For a time, Massachusetts had prohibited lawyers from serving
in its colonial assembly.85 This practice likely resulted from the belief that
there existed an inherent conflict in allowing lawyers, who profited from the
law, to make the law. 86 After the American Revolution, the number of
lawyers in the legislature began to grow. In 1780, only 10.4% of senators and
1.5% of representatives elected to the General Assembly of Massachusetts
were lawyers. 87 By 1800, 18.7% of Massachusetts State senators and 10.2%
of Massachusetts State representatives were lawyers, with the Senate
reaching an antebellum high of 37.5% from 1830-1840 and the House
reaching an antebellum high of 14.9% in 1820.88
Although lawyers did not comprise a majority of either legislative body,
they did, over time, have a great impact on legislation. Lawyers were much
more represented among the Federalists and the Moderate Republicans than
the Radical Republicans. Although each party strongly promoted its own
method of judicial reform, it was the Federalist Party that controlled
Massachusetts politics from 1797 to 180689 and the reforms enacted during
that time reflected their control. Such reforms included enlargement of the
Court of Common Pleas jurisdiction, increased salaries for judges, and failed
attempts to limit jury powers. 90 In contrast, the Republicans asserted that the
Federalist Party was controlled by lawyers who wanted a complicated system
82

Id. at 68-69.

83 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 116 (citing Rules of the Supreme
Court, Tyng,

Reports, 5:382-385).
84

Id. at 117.
85 AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 8.
86 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 5, at 43.
87 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 67 (See Table 8).
88
Id.
89 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 207.
90
Id. at 196.
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of law that would support their professions. 9 1 The Radical Republicans
wanted to see more equitable and convenient justice practiced at the hands of
laypersons; they objected to judicial reform that would increase the judges'
salaries or the courts' power. 92
The hostility between the Federalists, on the one hand, and the Radical
Republicans, on the other, was nowhere more evident than in the events
surrounding the feud between Benjamin Austin and a Boston lawyer named
Thomas 0. Selfridge, a feud that ultimately ended in the death of Benjamin
Austin's son, Charles, in August of 1806.93 In July of 1806, Benjamin Austin
was in charge of organizing a Republican tent at a Fourth of July Celebration
in Boston. 94 Austin ordered food to be catered from a local tavern and agreed
to pay the tavern owner from the profits made from tickets sold at the tent.95
As the parade made its way toward Austin's tent, the tent was overrun by a
crowd that had gathered around the Tunisian Ambassador to the U.S. 96 The
crowd entered Austin's tent, where they ate and drank without purchasing
tickets. 97 As a result, at the end of the day, Austin had not collected enough
money from ticket sales to fully reimburse the caterer for his expenses. 98
Austin had begun working out a settlement with the caterer, a man
named Eager, when Thomas Selfridge, a Federalist lawyer, filed suit on
Eager's behalf.99 Austin claimed that Selfridge had solicited Eager's business
(had "sought the case") and that Selfridge had done so in an attempt by the
Federalists to publicly embarrass the Republicans. 0 0 Although a settlement
between Austin and Eager ultimately was reached, the dispute between
Austin and Selfridge continued.10 ' Selfridge eventually approved of the
settlement between Eager and Austin, but remained upset with Austin's
comments that he had solicited business.1 02 Selfridge demanded a public

91 Id. at 213.

92 Id. at 192, 197.
93 For the following discussion of Charles' Austin's death and the trial that
followed, see Julius J. Marke, The Case of the OutragedLawyer, 2 LITIG. 37, 37-40, 5051 (1975-1976); Ellis, supra note 11, at 218-19.
94 Marke, supra note 93, at 37.
95 Id.
96 I
97 Id
98 Id
99 Marke, supra note 93, at 37.
100 Id
101 Id.
102
Id. at 37-38.
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apology, but Austin refused.10 3 Austin privately admitted that Selfridge had
not solicited Eager's business and Austin even went so far as to claim that he
had retracted any such previous claims to the contrary.104 This private
acknowledgement was not enough for Selfridge, who wanted a written
retraction published in the newspaper. 0 5
Austin and Selfridge feuded back and forth verbally until August 4 t,
1806, when both men posted notices in the local newspapers.1 0 6 Selfridge's
notice in the Boston Gazette proclaimed his own innocence and charged
Austin with circulating "an infamous falsehood concerning my professional
conduct," while Austin's notice in the Independent Chronicle called
Selfridge's notice "insolent and false." 10 7 Both men offered to their readers
proof of the facts behind their notices, but Austin took it a step further and
made it known to Thomas Welsh, who had been acting as an intermediary
between the two, that Austin "would arrange for 'some person upon a footing
with [Selfridge] to take him in hand. "'108 That person ended up being
Austin's own son, Charles.
Charles Austin, a student at Harvard, happened to be in Boston on
August 4th, the day the postings ran in the paper.109 After reading the
postings, Charles purchased a "strong hickory cane." 10 At midday,
Selfridge, who habitually carried a pistol, came upon Charles Austin on his
way to the Exchange.' Charles struck Selfridge over the head with the cane
and Selfridge shot Charles, killing him; "[a]t the trial, who made the first
movement never was satisfactorily established." 1 2
Selfridge was charged with manslaughter in Charles' death and the trial,
which was held at the Supreme Judicial Court on December 23, 1806, took
on a highly politicized tone. 1 13 Four members of the Massachusetts Bar
defended Selfridge.11 4 Justice Issac Parker, who later became Chief Justice of

103 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 218-19.
104 Marke, supra note 93, at 38.
105 Id
106 Id
107 As quoted in Id.
108 Id

109 Marke, supra note 93, at 38.
110 Id

I1 Idl
112 Id. See also ELLIS, supra note 11, at 220-21.
113 Marke, supra note 93, at 38.
114 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 218-19.
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the Supreme Judicial Court, presided.' 15 Paul Revere served as foreman of
the jury. 116 The political overtones were evident and, when Selfridge's
attorney Samuel Dexter made his closing argument, he urged the jurors,
whether they were "Republican Federalists" or "Democratic Republicans" to
forget the political party to which they belonged: "I ask you to forget it; leave
all your political opinions behind you...."I 17

After fifteen minutes of jury deliberation, Selfridge was found not
guilty.118 The consensus at the time was that the jury had not put their
political opinions behind but, instead, had voted in line with their Federalist
majority.11 9 As Selfridge noted in 1807 work, 'Soon after the acquittal, mobs
and riots infested the town, burning effigies, libelling [sic] jurors and judges,
and threatening to murder, etc. These outrages were anticipated by judicious
men, in consequence of the wanton publications in the Chronicle and other
democratic newspapers." 1 20
Following Selfridge's acquittal, the Republicans saw an upsurge of
support and, in 1807, they were successful in capturing the executive branch
and both houses of the legislature for the first time in 10 years.121 With this
increase in power, the Radical Republicans began pushing for more law
reforms that favored the layperson: arbitration to replace litigation; elected
judges, which they believed would be more responsive to the layperson;
increased law-making duties for juries, who would be made up of laypersons;
and an outcry against the recent Supreme Judicial Court justices' salary
increase. 122 The Radical Republicans lost to the Federalists in 1809123 and by
the time the Republicans returned to power in 1811, the Radical wing was
fatally weakened and conflict over judicial reform in Massachusetts had been
effectively resolved in favor of the Moderates.124 The Massachusetts
movement to replace litigation with arbitration, primarily promoted by the
Radical Republicans, had failed. Yet, the triumph of the legal elite was not
complete, since arbitration continued, and was strengthened, as a mechanism
115 Marke, supra note 93, at 38.
116 Id
117 Id. at 38-40.
118
ELLIS, supra note 11, at 218-19.
119 Marke, supra note 93, at 50-51.
120 From Thomas 0. Selfridge, "'A Correct Statement of the Whole Preliminary
Controversary [sic] between Tho. 0. Selfridge and Benj. Austin,"' quoted in Marke,
supra note 93, at 50.
121 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 220-21.
122 Id. at 222.
123 Id. at 229.
124 Id at 229.
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of dispute resolution. Benjamin Austin's pamphlet campaign in support of
arbitration provides some insight as to the reasons why.
IV. AUSTIN'S PAMPHLET CAMPAIGN: A POLARIZED PUBLIC POLICY
DEBATE
Benjamin Austin's hostility towards Thomas Selfridge as a Federalist
lawyer soliciting litigation is representative of Austin's larger hostility
toward the growing legal profession. "Among the multiplicity of evils which
we at present suffer," Austin stated, "there are none more justly complained
of than those we labour under by the many pernicious practices in the
profession of the law."l 25 In forming his arguments, Austin made clear that
both the study and the practice of law had the potential to be honorable, but
that the "order" of lawyers was "endeavouring [sic] to perplex and embarrass
every judicial proceeding . . . rendering intricate even the most evident
principles of law . . ."126 By using the term "order," Austin appealed to his
readers' understanding of class systems as they had carried over from
England and had been incorporated into the societal structures of early
America.127 In the English framework, there were three orders or estates:
"the clergy", "the noble or 'gentle"', and "the common people".12 8
Americans adopted this language and the ideas behind it, using "the terms
'esquire' and 'gentleman' to describe the members of their landed,
mercantile, and professional elites, just as the British did. They too spoke and
wrote of the richer or better, middling, and lower, poorer, or inferior 'sorts'
or 'classes."'129 Yet, America differed from England in that it did not have a
"hereditary aristocracy"; instead, it had "a significant urban 'middling sort'
engaged in commercial and professional occupations." 30 The Americans
also exalted "[t]he ideal of a decent independent 'competency' [which] was
attainable by most whites on the freehold family farms that typified much of
rural America."1 31
It is this American adaptation of English class structuring that Austin
was tapping into in his work. Writing at the time of Shays' Rebellion, when
125 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 3.
12 6 Id. at 4.
12 7

KEITH WRIGHTSON, THE BRITISH ATLANTIC WORLD, 1500-1800, 146

(David Annitage & Michael J. Braddick, eds., 2002).
12 8 Id at 133.

129 Id at 146.
130 Id. at 147-48.
131 Id
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family farms were most threatened, Austin placed himself firmly in the camp
of the agrarians and the Republicans, writing against the elites. Austin
repeatedly used the term "order" to describe the legal elite, and he
consistently did so in a derogatory way. In England, the terms "order" or
"estate" were normative and focused on "the honor or esteem accorded to
particular social and economic roles." 1 32 In contrast, the term "class" evoked
a hierarchical division of society "in terms of broad economic interests
groups."133 Thus, to Austin's readers, "order" suggested a group deserving of
"honor or esteem," but Austin's usage of the term, consistently in quotation
marks, suggested his skepticism in applying this definition to the legal
profession. Austin's favored term for the legal profession was the "lawyer
class", which signaled his identification of the legal profession as an
"economic interests group."' 34
Such distinction in terms is in keeping with Austin's persistent
assertions that this order of lawyers purposefully complicated the law for
their own professional and economic gain, and his corollary argument that
such actions interfered with the layman's ability to secure justice. According
to Austin, "the practice of the law ought not to be within the hands of an
'order' of men who pervert [the laws] by their mal practice [sic]."l 35 In
Austin's mind, lawyers were using their profession to form an elite class in
136
Massachusetts, which he described as an "aristocratical jurisdiction."
Austin argued that the order of lawyers sought their own financial gain
by manipulating court fees and timelines at the expense of the laypeople they
represented. Austin thus described professional lawyers as "needy persons
37 who
who meant by chicanery and finesse to get a living by their practice,"
were primarily concerned with their fees, and who were only too happy to
accept a delay of justice to increase their own profits.1 38 He believed that
lawyers thwarted the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution, stating that,
without the order of lawyers advocating for fee, "[t]he paltry litigious causes
amongst neighbors would not exist: Harmony and benevolence would more
generally prevail, and agree agreeable to my motto, 'Mutual passions,39 mutual
charms might lend, And each to each be neighbour, father, friend.'"1
132 WRIGHTSON, supra note 127, at 133-34.
133 Id
134 Id

135 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 34.
136 Id. at 15.
I37 Id. at 6.
I38 Id at 6.
139 Id. at 19.
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Austin was concerned not only about the "pernicious practice" of law,
but also about the growing influence of the professional lawyer class in
Massachusetts. He saw the order of lawyers "continually becoming more and
more powerful," inhabiting "every public department."1 40 Austin appealed to
the people to ask their legislators to do something about the growing
numbers of lawyers.1 4 1 He believed that if citizens did not take action against
this order immediately, the people would, in a few years, be removed of the
power to do so. 142 As the numbers of the profession grew and lawyers
increasingly entered the legislature, Austin suggested requiring that lawyers,
like judges and state's attorneys, be ineligible for the legislature.14 3 Austin
based his opposition to the legislator-lawyer on the idea that lawyers who
served as legislators would craft laws that would be so indefinite as to
provide for the lawyer's own arguments (and indispensability) in later
practice. 144 Austin found it "contrary to every principle of propriety to admit
men to make laws, who are living upon the practice of them." 45
To fight the evils of the rising legal elite, Austin promoted, among other
things, voluntary arbitration (described as reference) as an alternative to the
courts. He believed that seven-eighths of causes being litigated could have
been settled by referees,146 and he proposed an arbitration system that would
be cheaper, faster, and more final than a judgment in court. For example,
under Austin's proposal, disputes would be "settled by the determination of
three judicious men" who had "no sinister views" and who met "solely for an
amicable settlement of the contest."' 47 Unanimous decisions would be
binding on the parties.148 If parties were allowed to appeal the decision, then
the arbitrators' latest decision would bind.149
Austin argued that the attractiveness of such a cheap and speedy system
was widespread. He believed that such a system was appropriate to the
merchant, the tradesman, the husbandman, and others in society.' 5 0
Ultimately, he wanted to see an almost total replacement of litigation by
140 Id. at 8.
141 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 10-11.
142 Id. at 8.
143 Id. at 8-9.
144 Id
145 Id

146 Id. at 5. (emphasis omitted)
147 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 9.
148
Id. at 9, 23, 25.
149 Id.
150 Id
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arbitration, with only a very few cases settled by judges in court. 15 1 in
situations where a dispute between parties did go to court, Austin proposed
that the facts and the evidence should be conveyed directly to the judge and
the juries by the parties themselves, without the use of lawyers.1 52 He also
argued for the use of a fee table to regulate costs and provide for the efficient
and final settlement of damages. 153 In keeping with the Constitutional right
of counsel and the encouragement of layman involvement in dispute
resolution, Austin's proposal allowed individuals to be represented by
themselves or by friends who could possibly receive "a small established fee
from the Court, similar to a Juryman" to cover costs but he continued to
assert that to pay a lawyer who could influence the outcome of the case was
nothing less than a bribe. 154 Austin also strongly argued that the use of a
lawyer representative by one side deprived the common man on the other
side of the ability to represent himself, since he, too, would then feel
compelled to hire a lawyer to argue his side of the dispute.155
Austin's proposals for legal reform reflected his strong belief in the
layperson's ability to know and apply the law: "any man of common abilities
can easily distinguish between right and wrong (a trial by Jury is on this
principle) more especially when the parties are admitted to give a plain story,
without any assistance from lawyers . . ."156 In this area, as in the rest of his
writings, Austin's hostilities were directed more toward the practicing lawyer
than the judge. At this time, the bench was still largely occupied by
laypersons as the legal elite refused to accept the low pay and circuit riding
duties which accompanied the position. Austin believed that judges were not
in the same position as lawyers to be persuaded toward bias since they were
not paid by the parties for their services and, if the judges were biased or had
undue influence or were "perverted" by lawyers, they could be held in check
through removal from office and fixed salaries. 157 It was for these reasons
that Austin's Radical Republican comrades had promoted an elected
judiciary and opposed salary increases. In his writings, Austin asserted that
he did not want to abolish any order that would benefit society but that he
151 Id. at

10.
152 Id. at 5-6, 10.
153 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 10, 31, 47-49.
154 Id. at 21, 24. The idea of allowing a friend to represent a disputant in court was
not unique to Massachusetts. It had its roots in seventeenth-century English Law. See
ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA, VOLUME

I: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, 211-212 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1965).
155 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 18, 20-21.
156 Id. at 19-20.
15 7
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believed that the present art of lawyering "consists more in the sly art of
sophistry, than in genuine principles of fair and unequivocal arguments. The
sentiments of law are too generally . . . read by this 'order' with a design to

warp them to their own purposes and private emolument."I 58
Through his writings, Austin instructed the people to encourage their
legislators to enact the legal reforms and, especially, the system of arbitration
he promoted.1 59 He attempted to appeal to the people's ideal of a republican
form of government and opposed the "aristocratical jurisdiction" of the
lawyer class. 160 When a writer by the name of "Free Republican", whom
Austin suspected was a lawyer and member of the order, seemed "calculated
to pave the way for this aristocratical system" by having the "richest class"
with "everything at their disposal" rule in such a manner as to "seldom have
occasion to go so low as the fourth class for a majority of votes," 6 1 Austin
advocated again for republican government and protections for the "weak
and poor." 62 Austin believed that the order of lawyers operated on "one
grand principle which an aristocratical party would ever wish to inculcate,"
which was "to persuade the people, that a few men know the things
belonging to their political welfare much better than themselves."1 63
In promoting his reform measures, Austin was clear that he was not
attacking the law itself, which he saw as "necessary for the safety and good
order of society," or individual lawyers, who were "gentlemen of the
profession," but, instead, the pernicious practice of law and "the practitioners
of the law as an 'order' of men." 64 In attacking this order of lawyers, Austin
appealed to the anti-lawyer hostility that was prevalent at the time, stating
that "the community is so greatly. incensed against them [the lawyers]" that
they have "numberless enemies." 1 65 In this regard, Austin saw himself as the
voice of many, stating that the order of lawyers was an order of men that "the
whole community [was] condemning with one voice."1 66

158 Id. at 13. (emphasis omitted)
159 Id. at 5.

I60 Id. at 15.
161 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 28-29. The "fourth class" is a reference to the
poorest members of society.
I62 Id. at 29.
163 Id. at 45-46.
164 Id. at 3-4.
165 Austin, supra note 1, at 17.

166 Id. at 20. (emphasis omitted)
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In the arguments outlined above, it is clear that Austin recognized the
increasing numbers and influence of the legal profession.167 However, he did
not seem to apply this information to his discussion of the legislature, except
in his efforts to ban lawyers from serving in the assembly. As a result,
Austin's appeals to the legislators as representatives of the people did not
fully take into account the present strength of the lawyer class within the
representative assembly. As the Massachusetts records demonstrate, 68 the
very people he appealed to in order to abolish the order of lawyers
increasingly became the very people comprising that order.
Austin did, however, address the strength of lawyers in other areas
pertinent to his reform proposals. When the Bar acknowledged the evil that
was practiced within the order of lawyers and expressed willingness to
eradicate that evil while still keeping the order, Austin responded that the evil
was too completely entrenched, claiming, "We may think to remedy the
evils; but the poison lurks in the very vitals of the 'order'." 6 9 He
recommended a complete abolition of the order and stated that "several
towns have given instructions on the important subject of restricting, and, if
found necessary, of abolishing the present 'order' of lawyers."' 70
Even as Austin recommended the complete abolition of the order of
lawyers, he promoted the study of law at the university level. Although this
might seem contradictory from a twenty-first century perspective, it would
not have been viewed as so from the antebellum perspective. Austin's
arguments against the order of lawyers were focused on professional lawyers
who were trained by and admitted to the Bar. In contrast, university
education in law would be geared toward the layperson and aspiring lawyer,
alike. Such an education in law would provide a foundation for laypersons to
know and apply the law, especially in service as arbitrators, jurors, lay
counsel, Justices of the Peace, or judges the bench. For that reason, Austin
argued that a Professor of Law "should be established and the youth should
be early taught the fundamental principles of our laws; and from this
knowledge (with small attention) they would become qualified to take the
important station of judges."I71 Thus, Austin encouraged the study of the law
while still leaving that study accessible to all men, including laypersons who
remained outside the formalized legal profession.

16 7 Id. at 25, 31.
168 GAWALT, supra note 17, at 67 (Table 8).

169 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 31.
170 Id. at 45. (emphasis omitted)
171 Id. at 25.

604

LOST OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL GAIN

Austin advocated each of these small reforms as stepping stones to his
larger purpose, which was to secure cheap and speedy justice for the
layperson. To Austin's way of thinking, his larger purpose could be achieved
in one of two ways: it could result from the adoption of each of the small
reforms he advocated for in his pamphlet campaign, or it could come about
through the complete abolition of the order of lawyers and the replacement of
litigation in courts with a system of arbitration.
The system of arbitration that Austin promoted had a long history in
Anglo-American law, in general, and in Massachusetts, specifically.
Massachusetts merchants, of which Austin's father was one, 172 had widely
used arbitration prior to the time of Austin's writings. 173 However,
throughout the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the
nineteenth century, the mercantile class had increasingly brought their
disputes before the courts. 174 Austin himself was a merchant.175 He urged his
fellow merchants to submit their disputes to arbitration since the order of
lawyers was "wholly unacquainted with all mercantile concerns," but his
efforts to persuade his fellow merchants to join him in supporting arbitration
were fruitless.1 76
An exchange between Austin and a writer by the name of "Merchant"
highlights this point well. Merchant countered Austin's calls for arbitration
by asserting the right of the existence of a professional order of lawyers.177
Merchant believed that abolishing the order of lawyers would lead to a
decline in learned judges.178 Merchant described the order of lawyers as a
"learned profession, which embraces more extensive branches of science
than any other" and argued that to abolish the order of lawyers would mean
the decline of education as a whole.1 79 Thus, Merchant's main focus was on
the merchants' need for learned lawyers and judges who would know and
rightly apply mercantile law.

172 Id. at 52.
173 HoRwITZ, supra note 71, at 145-46. Horwitz describes the merchants' attitudes

toward arbitration and litigation in early America, but the context of Austin's campaign
and the dispute resolution reforms enacted in Massachusetts suggest that Horwitz's larger
thesis of an alliance between the judges, lawyers, and merchants and the triumph of the
legal profession over arbitration did not occur in antebellum Massachusetts.
Id.
175 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 260.
176 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 5.
177 Id. at 15.
178 Id. at 20.
I79 Id.
'7 4
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Austin answered Merchant's criticisms by stating that getting rid of the
lawyers would simplify the law and that the judiciary would continue to be
learned since, in light of his proposals for university level education in law,
any "gentlemen [sic] of leisure and abilities" (i.e., men who had the time,
money, and capacity to complete a university education) could be a qualified
judge."18 0 Austin further stated that abolishing the order of lawyers would
improve real education and do away with "sophistry" since, in his opinion,
the order did nothing to serve religion, duly execute law, enlarge commerce,
improve agriculture, or encourage manufacturing.181 When Merchant cited
concern over the increased number of cases on court dockets, Austin
answered that the cases were not evidence of the need for lawyers but,
instead, evidence of the "danger . . . from that 'order' whose existence
depends on this public distress." 182 In contrast to the courts, where lawyers
encouraged conflict and complex litigation to fund their work, Austin
promoted binding decisions by arbitrators, which he believed would resolve
the need to litigate in the first place.18 3 Perhaps sensing a lack of support
within his own merchant class, Austin criticized merchants whom he
believed had "become so infatuated as to place such causes in the hands of
lawyers." He included himself in his statement that, "by our own folly we
subject ourselves to the costs of court, lawyers['] fees, [etc.]."' 84
Merchant's response to Austin's proposals reflected a broad change that
had begun occurring within the merchant class since the colonial period and
that continued to occur after the Revolution. During the colonial period, the
merchants were a largely middle class group who widely employed
arbitration. 8 5 Merchants did not choose arbitration out of anti-lawyer
sentimentality.1 86 Instead, the merchants used arbitration as a more
economical, informal, and efficient means of resolving their disputes.187
When merchants did speak in favor of arbitration and against the legal
establishment, they did so as a means to continue to control their own
methods of dispute resolution, which were based on the commercial customs
180 Id. at 20, 25.
181

Id. at 20-21.
182 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 20.
I83 Id. at 5, 9, 25.
184 Id. at 9.
185 HORwITz, supra note 71, at 145 (citing W.C. Jones, "Three Centuries of

Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey," 1956 Wash. U. L. REv. 193
(1956); SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, 1674-1784, 44-45,

551-65 (R. Morris ed.,1935)).
186 Id. at 146.
187 Id. at 145.

606

LOST OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL GAIN

of their day.18 8 The merchants saw arbitration as a commercial-friendly way
to protect their interests in an era in which the judiciary neither adequately
understood mercantile law nor was disposed to rule in favor of merchant
claims.1 89 As reflected in a 1792 lecture on the law by United States Supreme
Court Justice James Wilson, the lawyers' lack of familiarity with commercial
transactions made arbitration and the use of a commercial court attractive
means to resolve mercantile disputes.190 Therefore, anti-lawyer sentiment in
the merchant class tended to stem not from the creation of an "order" of
lawyers or a legal elite, but from the very practical fact that the legal
establishment of the time seemed wholly inadequate to resolve mercantile
disputes in an efficient and economical manner. Since the merchants were
not practicing arbitration out of any widespread hostility toward the legal
elite per se, Austin's appeals based on anti-lawyer sentiment failed to
persuade them.
In spite of this failure, Austin did recognize the merchants' discontent
with the legal system, and he sought to appeal to the merchants on the
grounds that arbitration was cheaper, speedier, and provided outcomes that
were more consistent with the developing mercantile law. In this line of
appeal, Austin argued that lawyers were "wholly unacquainted with all
mercantile concerns" and that using lawyers only increased mercantile costs
and fees. 19 1 He encouraged merchants to use a system of arbitration that
would consist of three merchants who would know mercantile law.192
Although this line of argumentation came much closer to addressing the true
sentiment of the merchant class, it did not go far enough.
The eighteenth century commercial class in America consisted of
businessmen such as lawyers, bankers, merchants, and market-oriented
farmers who lived in the cities and coastal farming communities and who
were a part of the market economy.' 9 3 Although merchants favored the use
of arbitration in the mid-eighteenth century, by the end of the century, the
judicial establishment had begun to persuade merchants that it could
adequately, competently, and favorably resolve their disputes.194

188 AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 5.
189 HORWITZ, supra note 71, at 146-47.
190 Id. at 148 (citing 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 279 at 488-92 (R. McCloskey
ed. 1967).
191 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 5.

192 Id. at 9.

193 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 256.
194 AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 32-33.
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Several things happened to promote this change in the relationship
between the merchants and the legal establishment from the late eighteenth
century through the beginning of the nineteenth century. First, the
Massachusetts economy was in a depression during the 1780s but hit upon a
great economic expansion in the 1790s which, over the next forty years,
transformed Massachusetts from an agrarian economy to an industrialized
market economy that required new legal rules. 195 This expansion may have
helped relieve some of the anti-lawyer hostility exhibited by the debtor class
through Shays' Rebellion in 1786. Second, debtor and creditor rules were
revised to better suit the needs of the commercial marketplace.1 96 Third, the
Bar, which had been led by debt collectors and land conveyancers prior to
1790, was, after that time, led by commercial lawyers who began to
overthrow the anti-commercial legal doctrines of the eighteenth century.197
The merchants began to see the judicial system become more favorably
disposed to rule in their favor.198
By the end of the eighteenth century, not only was the legal system
beginning to adequately address the needs of the commercial classes, but also
so many lawyers were needed to represent the merchants in court that some
legal professionals had begun specializing in commercial litigation.199 In the
same time period, the mercantile community became increasingly diverse. 200
This increasing diversity and size of the mercantile community may have had
a weakening effect upon the community interest of resolving merchant
disputes through arbitration. 20 1 As Eben Moglen states,
[I]ncreasing economic specialization separated the commercial class into
several smaller groups with distinct interests: insurers and insureds, bankers
and merchants. The neutrality of arbitrators chosen from within the

195 NELSON, supra note 32,

at 146-47.
196 Id. at 147.
197 HORWITZ, supra note 71, at 140.
19 8 Id. at 154-55.

199 HORWITZ, supra note 71, at 140.
Moglen, supra note 13, at 149. Moglen's account highlights the type of changes
in merchant use of arbitration that Austin seems to be addressing in his pamphlet, while
also offering a corrective to Horwitz's conclusion that arbitration ceased to exist as a
viable dispute resolution model as a result of the judges' and lawyers' success in
convincing the merchant class to come to litigation instead of arbitration. See also, Jones,
supra note 13 (arguing for arbitration in New York throughout early America).
200

201 Id. at 152.
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community may have become less credible, thus giving rise to a desire with
the commercial class for a cadre of professional judges and advocates. 202
Reflecting both the professionalization of the law and this dual interest of
lawyers and merchants in the consistent resolution of commercial disputes,
the American Law Journal began publishing commercial law decisions in
1808 in order to inform the merchants of the law. 2 03 Although Austin's
pamphlet campaign and Massachusetts statutory reforms make it clear that
arbitration continued as a form of dispute resolution, even among merchants,
what is also clear is that, from 1790 to 1820, the merchants had largely set
aside any notions of anti-legalism they may have harbored during the
colonial and revolutionary period. 204
This change in the commercial class in Massachusetts had an impact on
the more partisan attempts to reform the law. Antebellum Massachusetts was
fairly commercialized, with a strong population of Moderates in Boston,
Salem, and the more populated coastal areas and a weaker Radical
representation among the less commercially-oriented farmers. 205 Members
of the merchant class were the foundational supporters of Moderate legal
reform precisely because that method of reform protected the growing
business community's need for a more rational, standardized law that was
not as subject to local prejudices. 206 In promoting Radical reform in
Massachusetts in the 1780s, the reformers did not take into account the
critical need to appeal to their opponents' economic interests. 20 7 Although
Austin attempted to appeal to the merchants' economic interests by
advocating for a cheap and speedy method of arbitration, he did not give
enough weight to their economic and efficiency interests in a more rational,
standardized rule of law. Thus, Austin reflected a wider failure among
reformers of his day in neglecting to promote a program which would appeal
to all groups in the state2 08-not only the general interest in cheap and
speedy dispute resolution and the laypersons' interests in knowing and
applying the law, but also the merchants' interest in certainty of legal rules
202

Id

203 HORWITZ, supra note 71, at 141.

204 Id. at 140.
205 ELLIS, supra note

11,

at 258 (citing PAUL GOODMAN,

DEMOCRATIC-

REPUBLICANS OF MASSACHUSETrs 70-127 (1964)).

206 Id. at 156 (citing JAMES WILLARD HUNT, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM
IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1967); R. KENT NEwMYER, THE SUPREME

COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 56-88 (1968)).
207 NELSON, supra note 32, at 71.
208 Id.
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and outcomes and the general interest in legal decisionmakers (judges, juries,
and legislators) who had the training necessary to know and apply the law.
By failing to promote a program that would appeal to all groups in the state,
Austin failed to gather the consensus and support necessary to persuade and
succeed in his reform efforts. 20 9 Austin himself seemed to concede to his
own inability to do so, stating:
The observations offered are solely intended for the public good; ...
Each individual will judge on the subject; if my principles are approved, let
them by adopted with resolution, by giving instructions to our
Representatives; [B]ut if we are willing to submit to the 'order' and bow
down under the practice, as an individual I must acquiesce in the
determinationof my countrymen.2 10

And acquiesce he did. After the War of 1812, anti-lawyer attacks by
laypersons, such as those promoted by Austin, did not cease completely, but
instead became utterly ineffective in light of the growing prestige of the legal
profession. 2 11 The ceasefire in argumentation also may have been the
outworking of politics: the mid-1810s saw an "Era of Good Feelings" in
which business expanded, the standard of living increased, and political
harmony ruled for a time. 2 12 Although Austin's 1786 letters were reprinted in
response to popular request in 1814213 and 1819214 he himself diluted their
radical, anti-lawyer appeal by including a "Prefatory Address to Candid
Readers. Never Before Published" which began with this quotation, a far cry
from the anti-lawyer sentiment of his original campaign:
What solid Joy is it, for a virtuous man, in the practice of the law, to think
he has received a talent from God which makes him the sanctuary of the

209

d

210 Austin, supra note 1, at 12 (italics added; additional emphasis omitted).
211 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 5, at 59.
212

Id.
213 Benjamin Austin, Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law As
Published Occasionally in the Independent Chronicle (Belcher, 1814), microformed on
Early Am. Imprints, Ser. II no. 30716, 43116, 31753 (AM. HIST. IMPRINTS) [hereinafter
Austin 1814].
214 Benjamin Austin, Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law As
Published Occasionally in the Independent Chronicle (True & Weston, 1819),
microformed on Early Am. Imprints, Ser. II no. 47029 (AM. HIST. IMPRINTS) [hereinafter
Austin 1819].
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unfortunate, the protector of justice, and enables him to defend the lives,
fortunes, and honour of his countrymen.-Rollin. 2 15

V. AUSTIN'S ULTIMATE

GOAL: CHEAP AND SPEEDY ACCESS TO
JUSTICE

In his prefatory comments to the 1814 edition of his pamphlet, Austin
stated that in the nearly twenty years that had elapsed since his pamphlet was
first printed, "the practice within the [B]ar, has become more congenial to the
happiness of society" and that he therefore "acknowledges the utility of the
profession, when conducted upon those honorary principles which give lustre
to science." 2 16 Far from his previous calls to abolish the order, Austin stated
that he wished to place the "order" of lawyers in a respectable and learned
rank of society. 2 17
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Prefatory Address is Austin's
claim that he never intended to promote "annihilation of the 'order'
(although he admits that it was "frequently mentioned in the foregoing
numbers") but that he meant merely to regulate the legal establishment. 2 18
He then went on to say that, in his previous writings, his sole purpose was
only to object to "the pernicious practice of certain individuals within the
Bar" while encouraging "the purity which ought to constitute a Court of
Justice." 2 19
If Austin's 1814 comments seem in stark contrast to his arguments of
1786, it is because they are. In the time that elapsed between his original
writings in 1786 and the reprinting of those arguments in 1814, Austin had
switched from acknowledging a few honorable lawyers while decrying the
rise of the legal elite as a whole and recommending its abolition through the
triumph of arbitration, to criticizing only certain dishonorable individual
lawyers while applauding the rise of the legal profession, recommending the
order's appropriate status in society, and abandoning the triumph of
arbitration. To smooth over his dramatic departure from his previous
position, Austin stated in his Prefatory Address that he was pleased with "the
happy reverse of the present practice" and, while acknowledging the antilawyer sentiment in his previous publications, stated that it was only through
215 Austin 1814, supra note 213, at 61.
216 Id
217 Id
2 18

Id at 62-63.
219 Id. at 63. (emphasis omitted)
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"[r]elying on the liberality of all classes of readers (not excepting the
gentlemen of the Bar)" that he was "willing to submit his sentiments to their
candid perusal", in "original publication" form, in the 1814 reissue.220
What can account for Austin's reversal? Austin himself attributed his
reversal to changes in the practice of the law that had made the securing of
justice by laypersons more simple and efficient. According to Austin, as of
1814, there were no longer "unreasonable delays" or "illegal charges" and all
classes could now appeal to the law with confidence: "[L]aw and justice are
synonymous." 22 1 He recognized that practices of complexity, high fees, and
delay, which he had formerly decried, could creep back in, but he believed
that a remedy remained: "[I]f the same impositions, within the [B]ar, are
now continued,as were practisedby some at the period when the foregoing
numbers were written, [then] that the same mode of legislative procedure
ought to be adopted as was then recommended."222 The "legislative
procedure" that Austin is referring to here is the piecemeal adoption, by the
legislature, of many of the legal reforms he had argued for in his 1786
campaign, including a statutory form of binding arbitration. 223 Thus, while
still affirming the proposals he had submitted in 1786, Austin's 1814
comments suggest that he, like his fellow merchants, had found that the
community's justice needs could be met within the developing legal system
and, as a result, he no longer felt the need to advocate for the almost sole
system of binding arbitration he had once so ardently promoted.
Austin had based his pro-arbitration arguments on anti-elite, anti-lawyer
sentiment when the merchants' true disagreements with the legal system
stemmed not from anti-elitism, but from the fact that both the lawyers and
the early American legal system were struggling to keep pace with rapidlydeveloping mercantile law, which resulted in decisions that were unjust. As
lawyers and judges proved themselves capable of handing down efficient and
consistent commercial decisions, the merchants lost one of their most
compelling reasons for submitting to arbitration in the first place.
2 20

Id. (emphasis in original). Austin's statement here is puzzling since the 1814

version has quite a few alterations when compared to the 1786 original.
221 Id. at 62. (emphasis in original)
222 Id. (emphasis in original).
223 Austin also may be referring to changes made within the Bar association, itself,
as the Bar association's revised standards for admissions and training led to a more
ethical and trained class of attorneys. In other words, Austin would not need to advocate
so strongly for layperson representation and methods of dispute resolution in 1814 if
lawyers had ceased to practice law in ways that he believed subverted justice. See
CHROUST, supra note 154, at 330-34.
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In order to gain the support of the merchant class, Austin needed to
propose a system of arbitration that would be able to meet the merchants'
needs for rational, standardized decisions on law outside of court better than
the rising legal profession could meet those needs through representation in
litigation. This he failed to do. By basing his arbitration proposals so strongly
on anti-lawyer sentiment and failing to promote an arbitration structure and
system that would address the more practical needs of the diverse merchant
community, Austin lost the support of the previous merchant practitioners of
arbitration and, eventually, failed to persuade even himself to adopt his
proposals for a nearly exclusive system of arbitration.
But merchants were not Austin's only audience, and the replacement of
litigation with arbitration was not Austin's ultimate goal. Austin's ultimate
goal was to secure cheap and speedy access to justice for all citizens and, as
the introductory comments to the 1814 republication of his pamphlet
campaign suggest, this goal was met through law reforms that took place
between 1786-1814-law reforms that included the legislative creation of a
statutory system of arbitration to go alongside the common law arbitration
that already existed.
For example, in addition to the 1786 Acts seeking to limit litigation in
personal and real actions, 224 the General Court also passed more substantial
reform with "An Act for Rendering Processes in Law Less Expensive." 225 As
stated in the preamble, the Act was intended to fulfill the legislature's "duty.
. . to provide means, whereby the decision of civil causes should be as
speedy, and attended with as little expense to the Citizens of this
Commonwealth, as the nature of things will admit." 22 6 The legislature sought
to provide such means in a variety of ways. First, the Act extended the
jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace over cases "triable by the common or
statute laws" except for cases determining real estate title.227 The Act
required that all civil actions valued at over four pounds go through the
Justice of the Peace before being "cognizable in the Courts of Common
Pleas." 228 Related to this requirement was the Act's overt encouragement of
224 Limitation of PersonalActions, supra note 67; Limitation ofReal Actions, supra

note 67.
225 An Act for Law Less Expensive, supra note 68, at 105.
226 Id.

227 An Act for Law Less Expensive, supra note 68, at 106. In this time period, the

Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts are riddled with exceptions for cases involving titles
to real estate, and the exceptions suggest an overarching policy of securing surety of title
as expeditiously and with as much finality as possible. See The State Library of
Massachusetts Electronic Repository, available at http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/.
228 Id at 111.
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arbitration (described here as "reference"). According to the Act, if a
defendant were to appear before the Justice of the Peace and dispute the
claim at hand, the Justice:
shall use his best endeavors, to induce the parties to a reference of such
dispute or demand; and in case the parties agree to refer such dispute or
demand, and agree on the persons to determine the same; the referees shall
have the same power, and the same proceedings shall be had thereon, in all
respects, as is pointed out by an Act passed the present year, entitled, "An
Act for rendering the decision of civil causes, as speedy and as little
expensive as possible. . . ."229
Thus, the Act encouraged disputants to submit to arbitration even before
entering their disputes before the Court of Common Pleas. If the parties did
not agree to submit to arbitration, then the parties could pursue a trial at the
Court of Common Pleas. 230 Even then, the Act sought to limit the role of
attorneys and even the playing field between the parties by limiting
representation in court to "but one Attorney ... on either side". 2 3 1
The "Act passed the present year", which is referred to in the above
statute, was "An Act for Rendering the Decision of Civil Causes, as Speedy,
and as Little Expensive as Possible," passed by the General Court in May
Session, 1786 and known as the Referee Act. 232 The Referee Act provided
for a forum through which parties in dispute ("a dispute of what nature
soever [sic]") could agree to submit their dispute to reference to be
determined by three referees of their choosing. 2 33 The report of the referees
then would be submitted to the Court of Common Pleas and would be given
the same weight and authority as if the report "had been made by referees
appointed by a rule of the same Court." 234 Furthermore, the Act provided
that:
[The referees] shall be vested with all the authority and power that referees
have been, or may hereafter be vested with, who have been, or shall be
appointed by a rule of Court. And witnesses shall be summoned to appear
before them and swom, in the same manner as is or may be prescribed by

229

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
231 Id. at 111.
230

232 1786 Referee Act, supra note 68, at 55.
23a3 Id.
234 Id. at 56.
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Law for summoning witnesses before referees appointed by a rule of Court
as aforesaid. 235

Thus, the Referee Act of 1786 made voluntary reference to arbitration,
the authority of the parties' chosen arbitrators, and the validity of their
award, as final as they would have been had the parties first appeared before
the Court of Common Pleas and had their dispute submitted to reference as a
rule of the Court. In so recognizing and affirming voluntary submission to
arbitration and the parties' selection of arbitrators, the General Court
extended, in practical terms, the dispute resolution options available to the
parties while also discouraging the continuance of their litigation. In
addition, the legislature continually affirmed this model of arbitration in the
years that followed. In 1836 the General Court revised all of the statutes of
Massachusetts in existence at that time, passing "An Act to repeal expressly
all the Acts which are consolidated in the Revised Statutes." 236 Although the
Repealing Act contained 70 pages of specific repeals, categorized by year,
the Referee Act remained standing and appeared in the Revised Statutes of
1836 in substantially the same form as it appeared in the 1786 original. 237
235 Id. at 57.
236 See An Act to repeal expressly all the Acts which are consolidatedin the Revised
Statues General Court, 1836 MAss. ACTs 582-651, available at The State Library of

Massachusetts Electronic Repository, http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/ (hereinafter -1836
Repealing Act).
237 Revised Statutes of 1836, MAss. REV. STAT ch. 114 (1836), available at the State

Library of Massachusetts, http://www.archive.org/details/revisedstatutesoOOmass
(hereinafter, Revised Statutes). The version as it appeared in 1836 was titled, "Of
Reference to Arbitration by Agreement Before a Justice of the Peace" and cited to
portions of the 1786 Referee Act in the marginal notes. The 1836 revision replaced the
term "reference" with the term "arbitration" and allowed for more variance from the
statutory procedures, if agreed to by the parties. Id. The statutory language states: "No
appeal shall be allowed from any order or judgment of the court of common pleas, upon
any award made under this chapter, but any party, aggrieved by such judgment, may
bring a writ of error, for any error in law or fact, as in other cases, and the supreme
judicial court shall thereupon render such judgment, as the court of common pleas ought
to have rendered." Id. The replacement of "reference" with "arbitration" was likely in
recognition that reference and arbitration, while often used synonymously, had distinct
meanings: "[reference] relates to a mode of determining questions which is distinguished
from 'arbitration,' in that the latter word imports submission of a controversy without any
lawsuit having been brought, while 'reference' imports a lawsuit pending, and an issue
framed or question raised which (and not the controversy itself) is sent out. Thus
arbitration is resorted to instead of any judicial proceeding; while reference is one mode
of decision employed in the course of a judicial proceeding." See "refer" in BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 1005.
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The Massachusetts State Statutes were again revised in 1860, resulting in the
General Statutes of 1860. Once again, the substance of the 1786 Referee Act
was incorporated into the statutory revisions, signaling a legislative
commitment to uphold voluntary submission to arbitration as a method of
dispute resolution. 238
The legislature was not the only branch of government to enact reform.
The Supreme Judicial Court enacted its own reforms and, as a result,
"streamlined procedure, shortened trials, cleared the dockets, raised the
professional level of the [B]ar, maintained decorum in the courtroom, and in
general made the administration of justice more prompt and less expensive
than it had been." 2 39 With these reforms, it would seem that Austin's ultimate
goal of cheap and speedy access to justice had been realized.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
When viewed in its larger historical context, Austin's pamphlet
campaign reveals the richness of common law and statutory law arbitration in
the antebellum period, highlights the robust nature of American state-level
statutory arbitration prior to the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, and
demonstrates the continuity of motives for and methods of dispute resolution
across American history.
First, Austin's pamphlet campaign, and the context in which it was
written, serves as a corrective to a prominent story in the legal history of
arbitration in America, which is that common law arbitration thrived in early
American but was eliminated as a viable option for dispute resolution by
judges and lawyers who passed statutes to regulate arbitration, and then used
those statutes to regulate arbitration out of existence. 240 The key players in
this account are the judges, who actively seek to bring the merchants into

238 Of Reference to Arbitration by Agreement before a Justice of the Peace, MASS.

GEN. LAWS ch. 147, (1860), available at The State Library of Massachusetts Electronic
Repository,
http://archive.org/stream/generalstatutesol 860mass#page/748/mode/2up,
citing to the Revised Statutes of 1836, Chapter 114 (which then refers to the statutes of
1786 Chapter 21, the Referee Act). Note: Where the Revised Statutes of 1836 allowed for
no appeal except on "a writ of error for any error in law or fact as in other cases" the
General Statutes of 1860 upheld this same language while adding in the right to appeal
for an error in a matter of law on the face of the record. Id. Such language tracks the
development of appeal for apparent error in law on the face of the award in other
jurisdictions.
239 ELLIS, supra note 11, at 229.
240 See generally, HORWITZ, supra note 71.
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court, and the merchants, who willingly turn from arbitration to litigation as
judges became better equipped to handle commercial disputes. 24 1
What we see in Austin's pamphlet campaign, however, is a twist on this
older story. The merchants were wary of courtrooms where judges seemed
neither to know, nor to rightly apply, mercantile law. But the merchants
themselves were in disagreement about where such wariness should take
them. Austin's literary opponent, "Merchant," argued for disputants to
pursue litigation with "learned" judges and lawyers, 242 while Austin argued
for disputants to turn to arbitration with "learned" laypersons. Both men
argued for dispute resolution systems that would be efficient and economical.
Thus, the dispute between "Merchant" and Austin was primarily a dispute
about how best to resolve conflict between merchants, and only secondarily
about which dispute resolution method-arbitration or litigation-would best
meet that interest. They agreed on their larger goal, which was for merchants
to have a cheap, efficient, and effective method of dispute resolution by
individuals who would know and rightly apply the mercantile law. Far from
eliminating arbitration or creating a system solely of litigation (the extreme
positions of each side), the piecemeal reforms that happened in the wake of
Austin's pamphlet campaign retained the judiciary while encouraging the
layperson's continued role in legal decisionmaking through common law
arbitration, statutory arbitration, and reference by rule of the court.
Furthermore, Austin had promoted a statutory form of arbitration as a
way to encourage and increase the use of arbitration as a whole. While it has
been claimed that early American arbitration statutes were created and then
used in order to interpret common law arbitration out of existence, 24 3
Austin's own later writings suggest just the opposite. In fact, by 1814, Austin
ceased to promote a system of arbitration to replace litigation not because he
had been defeated or because the legal elites had triumphed, but because his
larger goals for legal reform had been achieved. Austin no longer saw the
lawyer as a barrier to cheap and speedy justice, and therefore, he no longer
saw a need to oppose a dispute resolution model-litigation-in which
lawyers would be present. Austin no longer saw the lawyer as a barrier
because, as he proclaimed, the "pernicious" practices that had plagued the
practice of law had ceased; the legal profession had regulated itself, most
notably through piecemeal reforms passed between 1786 and 1814. The
241

Id.

242 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 20.
243 HORWITZ, supra note 71, at 140-60. For a contrasting history, see generally
Conklin, supra note 13 (demonstrating that judges in New Jersey and Kentucky
consistently upheld arbitration procedures and awards throughout the antebellum period).
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result was a dispute resolution system in which common law arbitration,
statutory arbitration, reference, and litigation all coexisted as dispute
resolution options for Massachusetts disputants. In short, arguments in favor
of arbitration were robust in the antebellum era, as were the systems of
arbitration that were used and promoted. Hostility toward legal elitism was
not hostility towards all lawyers or all individuals involved in legal
professions. Indeed, respect for the position of judge, legislator, and Justice
of the Peace continued and grew, even as lawyers increasingly inhabited
these roles. Even polarized arguments, such as those employed by Austin in
his 1786 pamphlet campaign, did not result in polarized, win/lose outcomes:
litigation remained .

.

. as did common law arbitration and reference by rule

of the court. Statutory arbitration was added to the mix. As a result, early
Americans altered the use of arbitration as it had existed in the colonies, but
they did not eliminate it in favor of litigation. In other words, there was no
triumph of the legal profession over layperson involvement in dispute
resolution.
At the same time, there was no triumph of arbitration over the legal
profession either. A second key implication of Austin's pamphlet campaign
is the way in which it acts as a corrective to the history of arbitration in
America. Discussions of the history of arbitration tend to begin, in earnest,
with the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, with a few
references to earlier arbitration models. But my research suggests that the
history of arbitration in America begins centuries earlier. The earliest forms
of American arbitration mirrored English arbitration as it had existed under
common law and in parliamentary statutes. An English Dictionary from 1684
includes the definition of an arbitrator as "an extraordinary Judge in one or
more Causes between party and party, chosen by their mutual consents . . .
who likewise divideth Arbitrement into general, that is, including all Actions,
Quarrels, Executions and Demands and especial which is of one or more
Matters, Facts, or Things specified." 244 The Award or Determination of the
arbitrators was called an "Arbitrement" and followed the format that would
later be seen in early American arbitration. 245 Blackstone included this same
1684 framework for arbitration in his Commentaries on the Laws of England
(1765-1769), which went on to become the most popularly consulted law

244 JoHN COWEL,

NOMOTHETES,

THE

INTERPRETER

Available through HeinOnline Legal Classics Library.
245 Id. ("artitrement").
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book in colonial and early America. 246 In Chapter 1 of Book III on Private
Wrongs, Blackstone defined arbitration as follows:
Arbitration is where the parties, injuring and injured, submit all matters
in dispute, concerning any personal chattels or personal wrongs, to the
judgment of two or more arbitratorswho are to decide the controversy ....
This decision, in any of these cases, is called an award. And thereby the
question is as fully determined, and the right transferred or settled, as it
could have been by the agreement of the parties of the judgment of the court
of justice. . . . And experience having shewn [sic] the great use of these
peaceable and domestic tribunals . .. the legislature has now established the
use of them, as well in controversies where causes are depending, as in
those where no action is brought, and which still depend upon the rules of
the common law. .. 247

As highlighted by Blackstone, arbitration in the Anglo-American world
took on a variety of forms, each of which was categorized by the timing of
the submission and enforcement of the award. 248 Common law arbitration
involved the parties in dispute voluntarily submitting their dispute to
arbitrators for resolution, typically prior to any action in court. The
agreement to submit to arbitration might be by word or deed, and the award
was binding on the parties inasmuch as an oral or written agreement would
be binding. As a result, parties in dispute would then need to seek court
action if there were any disagreements regarding enforcement of the award.
The common law also allowed parties in dispute to submit to arbitration after

246 Julius S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, in
ESSAYS INTHE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 451-457 (David Flaherty ed., 1969).
247 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *16-17. If the parties had previously

gone to arbitration in resolution of a claim, the plaintiff could not then bring action in a
court of law. See id. at 306. Blackstone's definition of arbitration is similar to that
included in RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 45-51 (1792). See also the
similarities between the forms outlined here and the forms outlined in the Massachusetts
Referee Act of 1786. For even later similarities, see also "Arbitrator" and "Award" in
JOSHUA MONTEFIORE, A COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY (1803).

248 For a discussion of the history of arbitration in English common law and acts of
Parliament, see Conklin, supra note 13, at 79 n.253. Some early American communities
also saw a dispute resolution model that looks like today's Mediation-Arbitration hybrid;
the parties would first submit to mediation by authoritative members of the community. If
that failed, the parties would submit to a dispute resolution similar to binding arbitration.
A terrific example of the American adoption of a Mediation-Arbitration hybrid would be
the dispute resolution model adopted by the Quakers within their own communities.
Portions of this model were also incorporated into New Jersey's later arbitration
legislation. Conklin, supra note 13, at 69-96.
619

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol.28:3 2013]

action in court was already pending. This type of arbitration is most
commonly called reference or reference by rule (order) of the court. In
reference by rule of the court, the arbitration award (most often called the
referees' report) would be submitted to the court, where it would be entered
and enforceable as a judgment of the court.
Where common law arbitration followed guidelines outlined in the
common law and upheld by common law judges, statutory arbitration
followed a complimentary, but distinguishable set of guidelines laid out by
statute. 249 Statutes differed from state-to-state, but generally allowed for one
or both of the types of arbitration available at the common law, albeit with
more detailed requirements for submission, process, and award. 250 Thus,
statutory arbitration might allow the parties in dispute voluntarily to submit
their dispute to arbitrators prior to action in court and the arbitrators' award
then would be entered and enforceable as a judgment of the court, as dictated
by the terms of the statute. Statutory arbitration might also allow arbitration
to be initiated after the parties in a dispute had initiated action in court. The
decision to submit the dispute to arbitration could be through the parties'
voluntary choice, encouragement of the court, court order, or any
combination of the three. After the dispute had been referred to arbitration,
the award of the arbitrators would be entered as an order of the court and
would be enforceable against the parties. Thus, statutory arbitration
complimented the forms of arbitration already available at the common law.
Throughout the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, common law
arbitration continued to exist in America alongside the statutory forms of
arbitration that were beginning to be passed by the new American states. 25 1
In fact, these same distinctions continued to be highlighted by Henry
Campbell Black in his 1910 version of "A Law Dictionary Containing

249 Sturges, supra note 71, at 819-20.
250
d

251 While it has been argued that the requirements of statutory arbitration, in purpose
or practice, were utilized by judges to drive arbitration out of existence, contrasting
research shows a co-existence and mutual affirmation of common law and statutory
models of arbitration in the antebellum period and as late as the mid-twentieth century.
For a discussion of the decline of arbitration in the antebellum period, see generally
HORWITZ, supra note 71. For a discussion of the robust nature of arbitration in the
antebellum period, see generally Conklin, supra note 13. For a thorough discussion of
common law and statutory arbitration as they continued to exist in twentieth century
America, see generally Sturges, supra note 71.
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Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English
Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern" 252
When Austin assumed the existence of common law arbitration and
appealed to his readers to lobby the legislators for a statutory form of
arbitration, he was mirroring the common law and statutory forms of
arbitration that were already in place in the English legal tradition. 253 That
Austin was drawing on English precedent for arbitration is persuasive in light
of the other forms of English precedent upon which he draws in his pamphlet
campaign. For example, Austin argued strongly for professors of law at the
undergraduate level who can teach "the fundamental principles of our laws"
to undergraduate students so that "they would become qualified to take the
important station of judges." 254 But his argument here is just a reiteration of
William Blackstone's argument that Oxford needed professors of English
law to, among other things, teach the students, who may one day sit as
judges, how to know and rightly apply the English law. 255
Austin reflected Blackstone in other ways, as well. As stated previously,
when reflecting on the reforms that had occurred prior to the 1814
republication of his letters, Austin acknowledged "the utility of the
profession, when conducted upon those honorary principles which give lustre
to science." 2 56 Austin's use of principles and science is reflective of an
English Enlightenment understanding of law based on foundational first
principles, and law as a science that can be studied and applied. Like
Blackstone, Austin anticipated that a focus on foundational first principles
and the science of law would lead to the "happiness" (fitness or rightordering) of society. 257 Austin believed that lawyers who followed in this
path, rather in the path of ignorance or selfish gain, should be placed in "that
rank of society, which the most respectable and learned men, of all ages,
have been zealous to consider them." 258 He also believed that the reforms
252 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 83 ("arbitration"), 83-84

("arbitrator") and 1005 ("reference").
253 For an example of an early American law dictionary that includes the English
model of arbitration, see GILEs JACOB, THiE NEW LAW DICTIONARY 187 (1811).

254 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 25.
255 BLACKSTONE'S

COMMENTARIES,

supra note

247. Blackstone

makes this

argument in the introductory portion of his Commentaries. It is an argument he
previously made in the law lectures, which preceded his Commentaries by about a
decade. Blackstone's Commentaries were the most read law books in the American
colonies from before the American Revolution through the Civil War.
256 Austin 1814, supra note 1, at 61.
25

7

a.

258 Id. at 60.
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enacted from 1786-1814 had pointed Massachusetts' lawyers in that
direction.
Thus, in his discussion arbitration and in his theories about law, the
layperson, and the legal profession, Austin was engaging his readers in a
history of arbitration that existed long before 1925. English common law
arbitration was incorporated into the American common law, and state-level
statutory forms of arbitration soon followed. As a result, common law
arbitration, statutory arbitration, and litigation coexisted, largely in harmony,
throughout the antebellum period. 259
Considering Austin's pamphlet campaign in light of history provides a
starting point for reconsidering the richness of arbitration in the antebellum
period and the existence of complex, statutory forms of arbitration well
before the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. But perhaps the greatest
implication of understanding these richer histories lies in the third
implication of Austin's pamphlet campaign, which is the continuity of not
only the methods of dispute resolution available across American history, but
also the motives for their use.
Austin began his pamphlet campaign making positional, polarized
arguments for the .use of arbitration in place of litigation. While Austin's
proposal for replacing the system of court litigation almost entirely with
layperson arbitration was not adopted, his broader reasons for encouraging
arbitration and his concerns about litigation-based dispute resolution have
their counterparts today. In other words, Austin's arguments in favor of
arbitration as a pathway to justice are not unique to his times.
Dispute resolution scholars have identified six primary motives for using
dispute resolution today. They are: (1) "saving time and money"; (2) "having
'better' processes-[that are] more open, flexible and responsive to the
unique needs of the participants . . . [a] motive often . . . connected with

negative feelings toward law and lawyers"; (3) "achieving 'better' resultsoutcomes that serve the real needs of the participants or society"; (4)
"enhancing community involvement in the dispute resolution process"; and
(5) "broadening access to 'justice' with (6) "[an additional] motive,
sometimes subconscious,. . . [of protecting] turf for oneself, an institution, or
a profession." 260
259 For this coexistence in antebellum New Jersey and Kentucky, see generally
Conklin, supra note 13. For the coexistence of common law arbitration and statutory
arbitration, see generally Sturges, supra note 71.
260

LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DIsPuTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 13
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2009). The literature on dispute resolution is replete with arguments for and against both
dispute resolution and litigation, as well as arguments for an approach that seeks to
combine the benefits of both. A sampling of recent symposia highlights the prevalence of
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Benjamin Austin appealed to these same six motives in his pamphlet
campaign, suggesting that modem-day reasons for pursuing dispute
resolution are not so different from the reasons that led people to common
law arbitration, statutory arbitration, or reference in early America.
First, Austin argued for a system of dispute resolution that would avoid
"long, unnecessary delays [that] will swell a bill of costs," 26 1 or, in
contemporary terms, "sav[e] -time and money." 2 62 Austin argued that
individuals who sought the advice of lawyers ended up in the "most
distressing difficulties" as their dispute became a matter for the lawyers to
decide, and at an expense that risked the individual's property as well as
exposed him to "individual . . . ruin." 263 Rather than having their lawsuits
resolved, Austin found that disputants were "reduced to the humiliating state
of submitting to the extortion of official fees without any remedy" 264;
lawsuits "enormously swelled" the debts of the people, causing additional
problems to arise. 265 Rather than seeing the time and money spent on
litigation as a necessary part of the litigation process, Austin placed the
blame for undue delay and expense directly on the lawyers: "[B]y our present
mode, the lawyers become parties by their fees, and are too apt to delay the
business while there is any prospect of further profit." 266 The lawyers also
caused delay by their influence on the juries, who were "often .. . hindered
from coming to a speedy decision on a cause, by the labouring pleadings of
the 'order'[.]"267 Austin describes what he perceives to be the lawyers'
strategic system of delay as follows:
[I]nstead of a fair, equitable enquiry into the subject, every little advantage
is taken of each other. The parties are harrassed by constant attendance: the
trial is put off under some sham pretence to another term; and by the finesse
these six motivations in current debates on dispute resolution. See Symposium, Against
Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1117, 1117-1280 (20092010); Symposium, American Justice at a Crossroads:A Public and Private Crisis, 11
PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 1-180 (2010-2011); and Symposium, ADR and the Rule of

Law, 2011 J. Disp. Resol., 1, 1-195 (2011).
261 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 40.
262 RISKIN, supra note 260,

at 13.

263 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 4.
264 Austin, supra note 1, at 5. Austin included both "Court charges" and "lawyers'
fees" in this category of extortion, and also advocated for a "fee table" to regulate the
Court charges. Id at 6, 10.
265 Id. at 5.

266

0.

267 Id. at 10.
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practiced, the Judges themselves are obliged to consent to the delay.Finally, after sauntering at the heels of a lawyer from term to term, and
burthened [sic] with expenses, the cause is either submitted to a Rule of
Court, or the richest party by bearing down the estate of the other, obtains
268
judgment in his favor.
Austin described this system as a "tedious labyrinth." 269 He expressed
specific concerns over those situations in which, through such delay, "a
wealthy man may silence a whole [B]ar. . . .Does not such practice deprive a
poor man of every necessary mean to obtain his plea?" 2 70 Rather than seeing
the necessity for lawyers, Austin was driven to ask "whether there is one case
27 1
that absolutely requires the assistance of this 'order?"'
In contrast to the system of delay and expense that prevailed in litigation,
Austin advocated for a dispute resolution system in which "there would be
no 'order' whose interest it was to perplex and delay." 272 The primary
component of his system was binding arbitration. Austin wanted to see
disputes resolved in a "speedy and impartial determination.. .without the
enormous imposition of Court charges, and lawyers fees." 2 73 Austin argued
that arbitration would prevent "great trouble and expense." 274 Such a system
would meet the needs of merchants and non-merchants, alike, since
"nineteen cases in twenty could . . . be decided as equitably by referees, as by
a tedious court process." 275
Second, Austin argued that arbitration would better suit individual needs
for dispute resolution In an increasingly complex society, which is another
way of arguing for "'better' processes." 276 Austin believed that, in his day,
268 Austin, supra note 1, at 19. See Id. at 32 for a discussion of the costs accrued by
clients who are forced to "'dance attendance' for many days before [their] case is brought
forward." Austin argued that merchants suffered even greater expenses of time and
money because the lawyers were "wholly unacquainted with all mercantile concerns,"
which resulted in "a rule of Court," sending the case to reference. Id. at 5.
269 Id at 26.
2 70
Id. at 20.
271 Id. at 6.
27 2

Id at 24.
273 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 8. Austin also advocated for no representation in
civil cases or, at the very least, representation by a chosen friend; for a concise system of

law codes; and for an Advocate-General to act on behalf of those accused of crimes. Id. at
23-24.

2 74

Id. at 9.

275 Id at 25.
276 RIsKIN, supra note 260, at 13.
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lawyers were "rendering intricate even the most evident principles of law"
and that, instead of helping individuals to decide disputes, lawyers instead
were (as he so famously accused Selfridge), "employed as agents" for
disputants until such time as the dispute was ordered, by court, to be resolved
in arbitration. 277 In contrast to the that the practice of law as it had become,
Austin sought to "render the laws a blessing," and advocated for a system of
binding arbitration as the best means for meeting this end. 27 8 Parties who
submitted their disputes to binding arbitration would not only enjoy cheap
and] speedy access to justice, but also the security of knowing that their
"estates" would not be ruined "in consequence of perplexing law suits." 279
Poor men and rich men would stand on equal ground throughout the dispute
resolution process as they sought to settle their dispute. 2 80 In addition, all
individuals who submitted their disputes to arbitration would enjoy a level of
dignity and respect in the process, which was not always granted to them
through the course of litigation. 28 1
Third, Austin believed that arbitration would bring "'better' results" 282
for the disputants than a ruling by a court of law. As discussed previously,
merchants would continue to enjoy the benefit of having their disputes
decided by arbitrators who were well-versed in mercantile law. Even in
court, Austin anticipated better outcomes with a more heavy emphasis on
layperson involvement in dispute resolution. For example, disputants would
enjoy the benefit of having jurors and judges decide the issues of the case
without first wading through the arguments of those lawyers who "perplex
and embarrass every judicial proceeding . .. rendering intricate even the most
simple principles of law." 283 And all disputants would enjoy the benefit of
retaining the bulk of their damages awards, without surrendering a large
portion of that award to pay the fees of lawyers. 284
Fourth, Austin argued specifically for layperson involvement in dispute
resolution, an anticipation of modem-day arguments for "community
involvement in the dispute resolution process." 285 It is within this argument
that Austin most strongly included anti-lawyer sentiment, which corresponds
277 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 4-5.
278 Id. at 5.
279 Id
280 Id

at 8.
at 6, 620.

281 Id. at 10-11.

282 RISKIN, supra note 260, at 13.
283 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 4.
284 Id at 11.
285 RISKIN, supra note 260, at 13.
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to today's motive of "negative feelings toward law and lawyers." 286 Thus,
Austin argued for cheaper and speedier access to justice, better dispute
resolution processes, and better dispute resolution outcomes not only as ends
unto themselves, but also because he believed strongly in the layperson's
ability to be involved in the resolution of his own disputes-whether legal or
non-legal in nature. In this line of argument, Austin strongly mirrored the
arguments of William Blackstone, who similarly advocated for layperson
study and application of the law in the introductory portion of his
Commentaries on the Laws of England. In fact, throughout his pamphlet
campaign, Austin repeatedly advocated for the layperson's ability to know
and apply the law. To the extent that the law had been unduly complicated
through Massachusetts' adoption of the English common law, Austin argued
for the creation of a more simplified code of Massachusetts law, and, as
discussed previously, the creation of a Professorship in Law at the university
level to teach that law not only to the aspiring lawyer, but to the layperson, as
well. 287
Austin also advocated for layperson involvement in judicial dispute
resolution, claiming that "without the false glosses and subterfuges too often
practised [sic] by lawyers," layperson jurors had all the "Law and Evidence"
they needed to "determine on the cause." 288 He argued that laypersons were
more than capable of submitting their own pleadings to the judge or jury289
and that if they felt any lack in this area, they needed only to enlist the aid of
a friend to provide assistance. In such a system, the parties in dispute would
be "admitted to give a plain story, without any assistance from lawyers," and
it would be a story that other community members-the individuals sitting
on the jury-would be able to understand and rightly decide. 290
Fifth, in making the above arguments, Austin was creating a counterargument to what he perceived as a "protect[ion of] turf' by individual
lawyers and the legal profession 2 91 while also making an argument that the
layperson had his own turf to protect. Austin's version of the modem-day
turf argument is perhaps best highlighted by Austin's consistent description
of the "order" of lawyers as the rising "lawyer class". In contrast to claims
about the necessity of legal representation, Austin argued that the vast
majority of disputes did not "require[] any material law question" and that,
286 Id.

287 Austin 1786, supra note 1, at 12, 20, 25.
288
Id. at 5-6.
289
Id at 23-24.
290
Id at 19-20.
291 RISKIN, supra note 260, at 13.
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even those that did include such law questions "could have been decided
without the assistance of the [B]ar." 292 The fact that such disputes made their
way into court was, to Austin's way of thinking, the result of lawyers
protecting their turf by soliciting lawsuits, much as he had claimed of
Thomas Selfridge; lawsuits are "nourished by a band of lawyers, merely to
make money for themselves, from the purses of their clients". 293 Austin saw
this system as self-perpetuating: as one individual in a dispute retained a
lawyer, the other disputant would feel obligated to retain "a lawyer equally as
'cunning' as his antagonist," or, if not, be taken advantage of, as a result. 294
Finally, Austin's overarching purpose in writing and in creating
proposals for legal reform was to "broaden[] . . . access to 'justice" 29 5 for
every person, a motive that remains for disputants, today. When Austin
appealed to these six motives in 1786, and again, in his Prefatory Comments
in 1814, he did so because he believed that the system of court litigation, as it
had begun to develop in early Massachusetts, was particularly unable to
secure the cheap, speedy, and final resolution of disputes. In other words,
whether as a result of increasingly steep fees for representation; complexity
that led to delay; or the lack of finality of lower court decisions, Austin
believed that the rising legal profession was particularly unable to secure
justice for individuals in disputes.
Austin argued for arbitration because he believed that a system of
arbitration, which would be regulated and carried out by laypersons, was
more likely to secure justice for individuals in conflict than representation by
professional lawyers in courts of law. In making his arguments, Austin
attempted to appeal to the many different motives that might lead his readers
to arbitration instead of court. While Austin's pamphlet was written to
address layperson-lawyer conflict in late-eighteenth century Massachusetts,
many of his arguments have been present across Anglo-American legal
history, and are persuasive to advocates of arbitration today. Much has
changed in the content of the law and the nature of legal disputes since
Austin's day, but a review of the method of dispute resolution for which he
advocated, and the motives to which he appealed, suggests that, at least in the
field of arbitration, much also has stayed the same.

292 Austin, supra note 1, at 38 (emphasis omitted).
293 Id.

294 Id. at 22.
295 RISKIN, supra note 260, at 13.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In his efforts to promote arbitration as a replacement for the growing
system of lawyer-based litigation in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth
century Massachusetts, Benjamin Austin provided for his own failure by
basing his arbitration proposals almost entirely on a foundation of antilawyer hostility that was neither compelling to, nor workable for, individuals
seeking to resolve their legal disputes. Even merchants, who had favored
arbitration due to the courts' lack of understanding of mercantile law, began
to turn to the courts as commercial transactions became more complex,
communities became more diverse, and lawyers and judges demonstrated
that they knew, and could rightly apply, mercantile law.
With no real foundation to appeal to a wider audience, Austin failed to
secure the triumph of arbitration over the rising legal system. Yet, in contrast
to the prevailing histories, Austin's story is not one of loss and decline.
Although he failed to secure the triumph of arbitration over litigation in the
years following his 1786 pamphlet campaign, Austin did see the passage of
statutory forms of arbitration, and his pamphlet campaign seems to have
encouraged arbitration, keeping it alive, in its various forms, as a timehonored method of dispute resolution-one that existed, in Massachusetts,
alongside the growing legal system, throughout the antebellum period. 296 As
his later reflections on his own pamphlet campaign indicate, Austin realized
that although he had lost the battle, he had won the war; arbitration had not
replaced the developing legal system in early America, but the legal reforms
that followed his pamphlet campaign brought about the type of correctives
and access to justice that Austin, in promoting a dispute resolution system
based almost entirely on arbitration, had hoped to achieve. Once such
reforms had been secured, it was not so important that arbitration be the sole
method of dispute resolution; the harms that came from the "pernicious
practice of law" had, at least for a time, been mitigated, even as
representation in litigation, and the number of lawyers, continued to grow.
In accepting legal reform that combined litigation and arbitration, Austin,
perhaps inadvertently, promoted a coexistence of litigation and arbitration
that had been present in both England and the American colonies. In so
doing, Austin, again perhaps inadvertently, promoted a broad, creative, and
296 The form of statutory arbitration passed by Massachusetts in 1786 and upheld in
1836 continued to be included in the Revised Statutes, with increasing support for

variances from the statutory structure, at least through the Massachusetts statutory
revisions of 1860. See generally, Revised Statutes, supra note 237 and Of Reference to
Arbitration by Agreement before a Justice of the Peace, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 147
(1860), supra note 238.
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varied system of dispute resolution that included both common law and
statutory arbitration, meeting the new needs of disputants while also
acknowledging, affirming, and accounting for past reasons for the disputants'
use of arbitration. Thus, his call for reforms helped to forge a compelling and
workable dispute resolution system that made room for the increasing use
and professionalization of the law courts while also keeping arbitration
strong in the common law, statutes courts throughout the antebellum period.
Although Austin's arguments were framed in anti-lawyer sentiment,
Austin nevertheless voiced many of the motives that, today, lead a variety of
people to use extrajudicial dispute resolution instead of resorting to court.
Ultimately, those motives are tied up in our concepts of justice, and justice
requires both a just process-one that is, at minimum, even-handed and fair,
respectful of human dignity, and not overly expensive or time consumingand a just outcome-one that comports to the parties' agreement, or to legal
or non-legal standards of what is "fair" or "right." Austin originally thought
that the only way to ensure just processes and outcomes would be to send the
vast majority of disputes through arbitration, instead of litigation, where
delay, expense, and confused rulings seemed to win the day. What he found,
instead, was that the piecemeal legal reforms that were enacted from 1786 to
1814 did much to address the injustices he spoke out against, enabling courtbased litigation and statutory arbitration to achieve what common law
arbitration had already been doing so well: securing cheap and speedy access
to justice for everyone, layperson and lawyer alike.
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